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ABSTRACT
The purpose of the current investigations was to examine the effects of the amount of voice one
is given during decision-making on group behaviors. In particular, across two studies, participants were
members of groups that needed to make a decision. In these situations, participants were provided
varying degrees of voice during a decision-making process. Depending on the study, participants were
either given a direct voice (Personal Voice), an indirect voice (Group Voice), a direct voice and an
indirect voice (Composite Voice), or were not allowed a voice (No Voice). The results of Study 1
found that having Personal Voice or Composite Voice is related to increased perceptions of control,
trust, and certainty, and is related to more predicted effort put forth for the group. In contrast, having
Group Voice or No Voice was shown to be related to low levels of control, trust, and certainty.
Furthermore, Group Voice was related to less predicted effort given toward achieving group goals.
The findings of Study 1 suggest that the reason more voice is related to more positive group effort is
because of how trust in the decision-maker is positively related to being more certain of what that
decision-maker will do, which in turn predicts more certainty of how the decision will affect one’s self
as a member of the group in the future. The results of Study 2 found that Personal Voice was related to
increased perceptions of voice and certainty, with Group Voice and No Voice related to low levels of
certainty. Interestingly, Study 2 found that more voice given to group members was related to less
behavioral output on behalf of the group. The relationship between having more voice and less effort
was explained by perceptions of certainty. The findings of the current research suggest that groups
must take care to ensure their members are treated in a fair manner because there are both benefits and
limitations to providing members a voice during decision-making.
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Are All Voices Created Equal?: Conditional Indirect Effects of Directness of
One’s Voice on Perceived Uncertainty and Performance
The purpose of the current set of investigations is to examine to what extent various forms of
procedural justice affect group members' perceptions and beliefs in ways that either promote or hinder
cooperation. Understanding the notion of justice has interested scholars for centuries (Colquitt,
Greenberg, & Zapata-Phelan, 2005), and defining the concept of procedural justice has been an activity
of psychological and organizational researchers for over 40 years. In those years, a vast literature has
emerged providing evidence of the positive relationships procedural justice has with people’s attitudes
and behaviors, such as increased feelings of respect (Blader & Tyler, 2009; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005;
Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992), strongly identifying with one’s organization (Tyler &
Blader, 2000), increased commitment to one’s group (e.g., Jones, Scarpello, & Bergmann, 1999;
Konovsky, Folger, & Cropanzano, 1987; McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992), feeling confident one is not
being exploited by group authorities (Lind & Van den Bos, 2002), and behavioral engagement with
one’s group (e.g., cooperation; Tyler & Blader, 2003)
Given the vast amount of literature conducted in the past on procedural justice, it is important to
be clear as to the definition/operationalization of this construct to be used in the current investigations.
Procedural justice has previously been judged to be present and/or operationalized when procedures are
consistent, unbiased, accurate, correctable, and/or ethical (for review see Colquitt et al., 2005).
However, Tyler and Lind (2000) propose a broad definition of procedural justice in that justice exists if
the measures and social processes by which decisions are made and/or the method by which rules are
enforced are perceived to be fair. Within Tyler and Lind’s (2000) definition, if procedural justice is
said to involve social processes by which decisions are made, then the inclusion or exclusion of
individual opinions during a group decision-making process may become important in people’s
perceptions of fairness. In other words, one may only perceive a sense of procedural justice as long as
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group decisions were arrived at in an all-inclusive manner. Tyler and Lind’s definition of procedural
justice suggests that an important factor in individual’s sense of justice may be whether or not one is
given a voice during group decision-making.
Procedural Justice as Voice
Group members are said to experience a fair course of action when included in a group’s
decision-making process by being allowed to voice opinions, with the hope that the ultimate decision
made may support one’s interests and goals. This general definition of procedural justice will be the
focus of the current investigations. This broad idea of having voice as a signal of justice was a major
theme in the early organizational justice research. Early operationalizations of procedural justice
involved manipulating whether participants had a sense that they were able to control the process by
which they received outcomes. Having control is desirable due to the sense that one can receive what
one desires, such as a group decision that benefits one’s self-interests. Thibaut and Walker’s (1975)
seminal work focused on dispute resolutions and found those who were given a chance to contribute to
the resolution process (i.e., voicing one’s concerns to the decision makers) were more satisfied with the
outcome of the decision than those who were not given a chance to contribute. Similar results have
been found regarding satisfaction of decisions, in addition to increased acceptance of such decisions
(e.g., Peterson, 1999; Ståhl, Van Prooijen, & Vermunt, 2004; Van den Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998), and
willingness to then cooperate (e.g., Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994).
If all affected parties involved are given a chance to contribute in the decision-making process,
the outcomes for everyone may be more attractive and beneficial by way of the synthesis of all relevant
information. Voicing one’s concerns “serves the cause of equity because it gathers information directly
from the parties to the dispute” (Tyler & Lind, 2000, p. 70). Those who voice their opinions are said to
have both “process control” and “outcome control,” in that they hold an amount of sway over the
decision making process and to subsequently help determine their own outcomes by way of the
2

decisions made, respectively (Shapiro & Brett, 2005).
Although opportunities for having a direct voice are quite common, they do not represent all
possible situations under which voice may be given. Equally important situations exist where direct
member input is unlikely or impossible, such as during intergroup decision-making (e.g., political-party
policy making at the national level). In those circumstances, a group representative of member
interests is given a voice during decision-making. Giving each individual group member a direct voice
in decisions in such a situation may be impractical and unmanageable. However, individual members
may still believe their interests are taken into account in these circumstances by having an indirect
voice during the process (Terwel, Harinck, Ellemers, & Daamen, 2010). Therefore, it is important to
make a conceptual distinction between two methods of experiencing voice: personal voice and group
voice.
Personal Voice or Group Voice
What has consistently been defined as voice (e.g., Shapiro & Brett, 2005; Thibaut & Walker,
1975) can more precisely be termed personal voice (Terwel et al., 2010): every person can have a
direct say in group decisions. Personal voice has its limitations. If personal voice was provided to
members of a relatively large group, then the decision-making process may quickly suffer. As the size
of the group increases, so does the number of varying self-serving opinions needing to be accounted
for, resulting in the decreased likelihood of reaching a satisfying decision for all involved. Members
may also not be able to experience personal voice due to time constraints; large groups have too many
members voicing opinions to the point time runs out, and a decision must be made before one’s
personal voice can be heard. Additionally, members of a large group may hold dissimilar beliefs and
goals, thus naturally dividing into subgroups supporting the various viewpoints on the matter at hand;
the initial intragroup decision-making process may quickly become more inter(sub)group. A decision
may never be reached due to members vehemently supporting their own opinions at the expense of
3

compromise (perhaps a form of subgroup-ingroup bias; Brewer, 2007; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis,
2002; Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006). Consequently, the decision-making process may
be interrupted by such tangential, self-serving competition, and members may never be able to have the
opportunity to have direct input.
Terwel et al. (2010) studied the concept of group voice to understand how providing the
opportunity for voice can work within groups where personal voice is not an option (e.g., with
relatively large numbers of members competing to be heard). Terwel et al. define group voice as the
“opportunity for interest groups to express their opinions in decision-making processes” (p. 174) on
behalf of a larger population that is unable to have a direct voice. In other words, a select few are given
a voice to express the opinions on behalf of the needs and interests of the many.
Such representation can take various forms, allowing for the experience of group voice to occur
in a variety of circumstances. Fellow ingroup members may serve on a committee to make decisions
within the group. Group voice may also exist if a group authority expresses the interests of the group
to a mediating third-party during intergroup interactions. Common to both intergroup and intragroup
decision-making is the idea that individual group members’ voices being expressed are indirect, or
implied, for the individual members (Terwel et al., 2010). Despite Terwel and colleagues’ focus on a
group of representatives providing a voice for a sub-group population, it is possible the psychological
experience of group voice may be more easily understood as believing one's interests are being voiced
although not being able to provide personal input. Therefore, to more easily test the personal effects of
group voice in the current investigations, the presence of a single individual serving as one's
representative voice was used.
Composite Voice. A variation on group voice may involve individual group members
experiencing personal voice prior to, and in conjunction with, experiencing group voice (a hybrid of the
two forms). Terwel et al.’s (2010) definition of group voice excludes any direct input individual group
4

members may give in order to influence the representative’s voice. In reality, it may be much more
common for all group members (representative included) to meet and allow every member an
opportunity to voice his or her opinions directly to the representative, who would then be sent to the
decision-makers to voice the now agreed upon opinion of the group as a whole. Therefore, the
experience of group voice may sometimes be preceded by an experience of personal voice (i.e.,
composite voice). The question remains as to which experience of voice, personal or group, may
dominate the effects on perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors, or would emergent effects be found based
on the interaction of the two distinct forms of voice? Composite voice may represent a middle-ground,
with the positive and negative attributes of both personal voice and group voice interacting to create a
unique voice effect on behavior. This additional form of voice will be tested in comparison to both
personal voice and group voice.
Effects of Group Voice
The various forms voice may take can result in distinct psychological experiences. Terwel et
al.'s (2010) notion of group voice may be unique in the sense that despite having one's interests
championed (if merely indirectly), the psychological consequences may be similar to that of when one's
interests are actively disregarded. In particular, group members experiencing group voice are unlikely
to feel they have any direct control over their outcomes. Ultimately a group authority, or some form of
representation, may be the ultimate decision-maker when a choice needs to be made within one’s group
or among multiple groups. The power of personal voice lies in the quality of how one is treated (e.g.,
respect) being communicated by a decision maker hearing one’s opinion on a matter. Group voice may
be unlikely to convey any such respect from decision makers because of the lack of opportunity to
express opinion and/or a diffusion of relational information. Rather than personal voice signaling that
one is being treated fairly one-on-one (e.g., Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990), group voice signals that any
fair treatment may be a compromise (i.e., averaged) and distributed across all members, thus diffusing
5

the impact of experiencing this form of procedural justice.
Despite the fundamental differences between personal voice and group voice, Terwel et al.
(2010) found that group voice was preferred more than not receiving voice at all. Terwel et al.
conducted three studies testing the effects of group voice, compared to experiencing no voice, on group
members’ perceptions of fairness, perceived trust, and acceptance of the decision having to be made.
Across these studies, Terwel et al. manipulated whether participants read scenarios in which a special
interest group for participants’ beliefs (i.e., pro carbon dioxide capture and storage technology; CCS)
and a special interest group contrary to participants’ beliefs (i.e., industrial organization against CCS)
were either both given equal amounts of group voice or no group voice at all, or that both groups were
given unequal amounts of group voice (i.e., for-CCS interest group gets group voice and against-CCS
interest group does not get group voice, or vice versa) during a multi-group decision-making process
regarding policy for the use of CCS.
Results suggest that the more group voice one perceived, the fairer the decision-making process
was perceived to be, the more trustworthy was the decision maker (also found to be a mediator), and
the more acceptance one had of the decision (Terwel et al., 2010). The findings suggest that a sense of
group voice, compared to not having a voice, is able to predict increased levels of a particular form of
cooperation because one trusts the decision-maker. The mediating effect of trust mirrors similar results
consistently found in the procedural justice literatures (e.g., Colquitt, LePine, Piccolo, Zapata, & Rich,
2012; De Cremer & Tyler, 2007; Folger & Konovsky, 1989; McFarlin & Sweeny, 1992; Tyler, 1989),
suggesting that group voice may represent a special route one may take to experience procedural
fairness. However, a key variable that personal voice and group voice may differentially affect is one’s
perceived level of certainty.
Certainty
Group members who are given personal voice value such an opportunity because there is an
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increased chance to persuade the decision maker to come to a conclusion in the greatest interest of
one’s self (e.g., Walker, LaTour, Lind, & Thibaut, 1974). Outcomes may be perceived to be more
certain if one feels capable of directing the decision being made towards one’s own benefit. The level
of outcome certainty (e.g., the decision outcome; personal resources) one may feel when provided with
group voice may be relatively low because “they are not personally able to exert control” (Terwel et al.,
2010, p. 174). With a representative reporting an opinion, the voice of the individual member is taken
out of the equation. Terwel and colleagues recognize complete removal of one’s voice from a decisionmaking process is unlikely (i.e., composite voice). However, Terwel et al. argue that the relational and
instrumental effects of group voice are “weakened” compared to those of personal voice due to the
implied nature of group voice processes. Terwel et al. conclude that group voice “at best, remains a
form of remote control for individual group members” (2010, p. 174) and involves a diminished
guarantee that one’s personal interests may be satisfied compared to if one experiences personal voice
(e.g., a representative negotiates the best possible outcome while still not being preferred by every
individual member). In other words, group voice may not be able to ensure a certain level of justice
compared to when experiencing personal voice.
Being given a voice may serve to increase the predictability of one’s outcomes, regardless of
whether being in favor of or against one’s own interests (Desai, Sondak, & Diekmann, 2011; Van den
Bos & Lind, 2002). If denied the opportunity to have voice, personal outcomes may remain highly
uncertain and subject to the influence of others who may not have one’s best interests at heart. General
uncertainty, or uncertainty about the nature or structure of one’s social environment or group, has been
shown to account for fairness judgments (e.g., De Cremer, Brebels, & Sedikides, 2008). Summarizing
Van den Bos and Lind (2002), Desai et al. (2011) argue that “fairness can increase the perceived
predictability of future outcomes and thereby reduce uncertainty” (p. 34). Fairness heuristic theory
(Lind, 2001; Van den Bos, 2001) suggests that employees use fairness perceptions to cope with
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uncertainty, and uncertainty management theory (Lind & Van den Bos, 2002; Van den Bos & Lind,
2002) argues that fair treatment by one’s group lessens group members’ uncertainty about group
authorities’ behaviors (Desai et al., 2011). Fairness has even been found to predict not only a general
sense of being uncertain or lack of control (e.g., Van den Bos, 2001) but also uncertainty about one’s
own mortality or one’s personal life (Van den Bos & Miedema, 2000). Desai et al. (2011) found that
perceived procedural justice is significantly and negatively correlated with perceived uncertainty,
operationalized as the level of knowledge of future outcomes resulting from the decision-making
process (e.g., “I know exactly how much salary hike I will get at my next evaluation”, “I do not know
how much annual bonus I will receive this year”).
In their third experiment, Desai et al. (2011) manipulated procedural justice by allowing or
denying the opportunity for personal voice. Participants were either given “take-it-or-leave-it”
ultimatum (i.e., no voice) job offers or were allowed to negotiate (i.e., voice a counter-offer) with
regards to earning points by completing mazes for one of two hypothetical companies. Afterward,
participants completed a series of questionnaire items prior to performance on a maze completion task.
In the series of questions, perceived uncertainty was measured as a possible mediator of the effects of
procedural justice, defined as the perceived fairness of situation, on performance (number of mazes
completed). Uncertainty in this study was operationalized as a general uncertainty of the current
situation and predictability of the future (e.g., “I can predict what will happen next”, “How uncertain
are you about what is happening in this situation”). Results supported the hypothesis that the amount
of uncertainty experienced in one’s environment is reduced when belief in the fairness of the situation
increases. Additionally, performance was affected in part by participants’ perceived procedural justice
by way of the increase or decrease of uncertainty.
Because Desai et al. (2011) manipulated being allowed to have a voice or not, their results
suggest that experiencing personal voice predicted higher levels of performance (i.e., more behavioral
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output in service of a group goal) because such a fair situation positively affects how certain the
situation was believed to be. Desai et al. tested the differential effects of procedural justice after having
just experienced either personal voice or no voice at all (e.g., imposed). With group voice, there may
be a level of uncertainty at similar levels to not having any voice, given the lack of direct input on the
part of the individual. In this sense, group voice may operate at the same level of having no voice when
compared to being given personal voice.
A consequence of the lack of certainty one experiences with group voice may be that positive
attitudes and productive behaviors toward one’s group may suffer and/or occur relatively less
frequently or at a lesser intensity; uncertainty may have a debilitating effect (Desai et al., 2011). For
example, performance may comparatively suffer in those experiencing group voice rather than personal
voice because productive, cooperative group behaviors may be seen as too risky (i.e., costly to one’s
self-outcomes) when there are low levels of perceived certainty regarding the personal consequences of
having only the representative’s voice being heard during the decision-making process. The
representative’s opinion may be entirely self-serving and in no way reflect the best interest of the self
or the group as a whole; decisions being made may be biased towards the representative’s desires and
needs.
In a similar fashion to fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001; Van den Bos, 2001), Colquitt et al.
(2012) propose that trust serves as an uncertainty reducing mechanism, helping to explain why justice
routinely predicts job performance. Specifically, in a field study in a hospital system, Colquitt et al.
found that a procedural justice factor (including items probing one's opportunities to express one's
views and influence decisions) positively predicted one’s level of cognition-based trust (e.g.,
dependability, reliability) in one’s supervisor, reflecting similar results to those found in Terwel et al.
(2010). This trust was then found to negatively predict perceived uncertainty, which then negatively
predicted job performance. Colquitt et al.’s (2012) notion of trust predicting uncertainty may be the
9

exact mechanism that drives members' perceptions of uncertainty during group voice exchanges
compared to those that involve personal voice. Having to work with a representative during group
voice situations may call to mind one’s level of trust of this individual (e.g., DeCremer & Tyler, 2007;
McFarlin & Sweeny, 1992) and how well he or she can truly represent one’s own voice. Group voice
may represent a low trust situation, particularly if the representative is not chosen by the members of
the group. Therefore, Colquitt et al.’s (2012) finding that increased trust predicts high levels of
certainty seems to be the key relationship needed to understand why group voice may predict low
levels of certainty.
Certainty may have unique effects on group-directed behavior. Increased levels of perceived
situational uncertainty may signal to individual members that their future outcomes will be limited or
unfulfilling, regardless of one’s level of performance; high performance may not be able to overcome
the burden of having to work in a group relegated to operating under the less-than-ideal decision that
was made without any input other than that of the representative. Uncertainty’s effect on behavior may
be multifaceted, stemming from the members being unsure as to whether the decision made was as
good as it could have been (i.e., be made more in one’s own favor). Performance may then decrease
during these times of lowered decision-certainty because group members may need to restrict or
redirect their attention away from successfully performing a task to thoughts of contingency plans and
ways to protect themselves and their already fragile and limited resources (Mayer & Gavin, 2005).
Similarly, McAllister (1995) suggests that uncertainty in a situation creates a need to monitor one’s
surroundings and behave defensively in order to protect oneself and one’s interests; performance
suffers due to the stressor-like quality by which uncertainty is perceived (e.g., Sonnentag & Frese,
2003). In other words, certainty of the outcome of the decision may predict perceived certainty of one's
future outcomes. Whether these instances of lowered outcome-certainty may then have a powerful,
negative influence on one's behavioral output is tested here as well.
10

Moderators
There are additional factors that may need to be accounted for to fully understand the
psychological impact of the various forms of voice one may experience, group voice in particular.
Understanding the relationship between the individual member(s) and the representative may be
crucial. Trust in the representative or authority (e.g., DeCremer & Tyler, 2007; McFarlin & Sweeny,
1992) and the perceived similarity among member and authority attitudes and motivations (i.e., ingroup
bias; Hewstone et al., 2002; Smith, 1940; Stürmer & Snyder, 2010) may interact with the experience of
group voice to predict behavior. Furthermore, whether the representatives were selected by the
members themselves (i.e., elected) or the representatives were chosen on behalf of members (by a
third-party or randomly chosen) may affect individual member’s trust and perceived similarity towards
the representative and thus positively or negatively affect behavior. The effect of how the
representative is chosen may further depend on one’s commitment to the group (e.g., social identity;
Tajfel & Turner, 1979). It is beyond the scope of the current investigations to test these potentially
influential factors. However, some potential moderating factors will be tested in the current
investigations.
Group Size. One factor that may affect the experiences of all forms of voice involves the size of
the group involved in the decision making process. One must ask how many voices are being heard by
the decision-makers. It was discussed previously the impact group size may have on one’s experience
of voice, including but not limited to the realization that the final decision made may be less than
satisfactory to one’s self-interests given the need to account for a multitude of varying opinions. The
more voices being heard during a decision-making process, the less important an individual voice may
be (i.e., social impact theory; Latané, 1981), and the larger the group, the less likely all voices will
ultimately be heard during group decision-making (e.g., Waller, Hope, Burrowes, Morrison, 2011).
With the diminished impact of one’s voice, the predictability of one’s future outcomes may decrease;
11

the belief that a decision will be made in one’s favor will be reduced with the inclusion of more “noise”
(i.e., other voices) in the situation.
Furthermore, one’s perceived level of certainty may differ depending upon which circumstances
personal voice and/or group voice are experienced (e.g., varying group sizes). If someone is a member
of a small group and experiencing personal voice, perceptions of certainty may be relatively high
compared to another person who is a member of a large group and is experiencing personal voice.
Although both can be said to have experienced personal voice, the increased number of voices heard in
the situation of the latter individual may subsequently lower his or her perception of certainty of the
situation and/or his or her outcomes.
The same conditional experience is expected to occur for those experiencing group voice, where
the amount of certainty may be even less due to having to experience decisions being made solely
through one’s representative. A variation of group voice in which one first experiences personal voice
(i.e., composite voice) may also lead to differing levels of perceived certainty compared to pure forms
of either personal voice or group voice. A group member who first experiences personal voice may
have a sense of relatively high certainty of the situation as a whole, but when the final decision is in the
hands of another person certainty may decrease, perhaps to levels that negate the prior experience of
personal voice.
Risk Aversion. As discussed previously, the level of certainty one experiences is expected to
predict the amount or quality of group behavior. This predicted relationship between perceptions of
certainty and performance behaviors may be moderated by one’s willingness to embrace uncertainty, or
the extent to which one is a risk seeker or risk averse. For example, uncertainty may stimulate
performance for those who enjoy the experience of risk (Desai et al., 2011). Risk aversion can be
understood as an individual difference variable representing one’s tolerance or avoidance of uncertainty
and the unpredictability of one’s possible outcomes (Desai et al., 2011; March, 1996). In comparison
12

to research on procedural justice suggesting uncertainty to be an unwanted characteristic of the
situation (e.g., Lind, 2001; Lind & Van den Bos, 2002; Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos & Lind,
2002), additional work has suggested that the desire for uncertainty may be variable across individuals,
with some finding risk appealing (Maehr & Videbeck, 1968) while others find risk unappealing (Halek
& Hisenhauer, 2001). Further research suggests that level of risk aversion has differential effects on
organizational behaviors (e.g., Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1989; Maehr & Videbeck, 1968). Level of risk
aversion has been found to interact with procedural justice (Colquitt, Scott, Judge, & Shaw, 2006), with
high risk averse individuals experiencing procedural justice increasing performance toward the
organization while low risk averse individuals not increasing performance. High risk averse people do
not care for uncertainty, and Colquitt et al. argued that participants were paying attention to signals of
fairness (e.g., having voice) because experiencing fairness could help “manage” or control one’s level
of uncertainty (Desai et al, 2011).
With this line of reasoning, it may be predicted that not only will risk averse individuals like
experiencing personal voice in order to reduce uncertainty, but risk seeking individuals will dislike the
experience of personal voice (a risk aversion x voice interaction). This predicted effect has been
suggested by past work. The desire for voice has been shown to be moderated by the value one places
on having voice (Avery & Quiñones, 2004). A reversal of the fair process effect may occur if risk
seekers are said to place little value on voice while the risk averse place much value on having a voice.
This reversal of the fair process effect is precisely what Desai et al. (2011) found, whereby risk averse
individuals actually reacted positively to not experiencing personal voice. Furthermore, one’s level of
risk aversion seemed to moderate the indirect effects of certainty on the relationship between voice and
performance, supporting the argument that certainty is an important factor at various levels of risk
aversion.
Desai et al. (2011) provide evidence that when there is a high level of certainty (due to
13

experiencing personal voice), high and low risk averse people behave differently, with high risk averse
individuals performing better than low risk averse individuals on a group-based task. When certainty is
low due to the lack of opportunity for personal voice (i.e., no voice), there was no differences found in
performance. Given the significant positive relationship found between personal voice and certainty,
the lack of difference in performance found under low certainty suggests that having imposed decisions
(i.e., no voice) does not have a strong effect on attitudes and/or behavior. However, the question
remains as to whether experiencing group voice, argued to also deter certainty, will exhibit the same
pattern of results similar to when decisions are merely imposed. The primary goal of the current
investigations is to examine whether a different pattern of results will emerge that contrast with those
found by Desai et al. Group voice may provide a better “fit” for low risk averse individuals, resulting
in an increased level of positive behaviors compared to those high in risk aversion.
Clearly risk aversion is a conceptually important variable to consider when studying procedural
justice’s effect on behavior. However, Desai et al. (2011) were limited in their testing of voice’s effect
on behavior by relying on a manipulation of personal voice only. The question remains as to whether
risk aversion and its differential effect on certainty’s influence may depend on the form of voice
experienced. Given group voice’s inherent level of certainty (Terwel et al., 2010) compared to
personal voice, group voice may be disliked less by risk seekers, while previous work suggests that
personal voice may be preferred by the risk averse (e.g., Avery & Quiñones, 2004; Desai et al., 2011).
Rather than risk seekers disliking voice’s effect of promoting certainty, risk seekers may simply dislike
one form of voice. Therefore, one of the current investigations seeks to answer the question as to
whether the attitudes and behavior of individuals both high and low on risk aversion may be positively
affected by experiencing the “correct” kind of procedural justice and the resulting increase or decrease
of certainty (i.e., conditional indirect effects, or moderated mediation; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes,
2007). In other words, does voice’s effect on behavior, through perceived certainty, depend on one’s
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level of risk aversion?
Hypotheses
Given the previous arguments, I formally propose three main hypotheses. First, personal voice
will result in increased perceptions of voice, control, and certainty. These effects may be qualified by
the number of voices being heard. Voice, control, and certainty will be lowest in the group voice
condition when there are large numbers of people involved in the decision, while voice, control, and
certainty will be highest in the personal voice condition when there are relatively few people involved
in the decision-making process. An additional qualifier of voice's effects may be one's level of risk
aversion. Group members high in risk aversion given a personal voice and group members low in risk
aversion given group voice may put forth more effort towards their groups compared to when those
high in risk aversion are allowed group voice and low risk averse individuals are given personal voice.
Second, the relationship between voice and behavioral outcomes will be mediated by
perceptions of certainty. The experience of personal voice, compared to group voice, will predict
increased perceptions of certainty, which will in turn predict increased positive group-based effort
and/or performance on a group-based task.
Third, an individual’s risk aversion will moderate this mediated relationship. High risk averse
individuals experiencing low certainty and low risk averse individuals experiencing high certainty will
predict relatively low levels of performance on a group-based task, while high risk averse individuals
experiencing high certainty and low risk averse individuals experiencing low certainty will lead to
relatively high levels of performance on a behavioral task. Low risk averse people will respond
negatively and have lower performance when experiencing more voice than when experiencing less
voice via the increase of certainty, whereas high risk averse people will respond positively and have
higher performance when experiencing more voice than when experiencing less voice via the increase
of certainty.
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Study 1
The goal of this study was to test the relative effects different forms of voice may have on
various process and outcome variables, including perceived trust and certainty. Participants were given
a brief scenario describing a situation in which they were a member of a group that needed to make a
decision. Across conditions, participants either experienced personal voice, group voice, composite
voice, or a no voice control. Furthermore, the level of impact of one’s voice (in comparison to the
voices of other group members) was varied by manipulating the number of additional voices being
heard. The current study was a 4 (Voice: Personal, Composite, Group, No Voice) x 2 (Group Size: 2
versus 20) between-participant factorial design.
Participants
One-hundred and sixty undergraduate students (20 participants per condition; demographic data
was not collected) from the University of Arkansas participated in this study for course credit.
Procedure
Participants entered the lab and were given an informed consent form to read and complete.
Afterward, participants were given a brief scenario adapted from De Cremer, Tyler, and den Ouden
(2005). The scenario included the following instructions: “Read this scenario as if you are
experiencing the situation yourself.” The scenario asks participants to picture themselves as an
employee of a company that produces and sells computer games and software. In this company,
employees work together in teams. At this point, the team structure was presented, and participants
were to believe they belonged to a particular sized group, depending on condition (2-member group:
“Your team consists of you and one other employee”; 20-member group: “Your team consists of you
and nineteen other employees”).
Next, it was made clear that a decision had to be made by the company regarding whether or not
to take a new computer game into production. To make the outcome of this decision impactful on
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employee outcomes, it was explained that taking the game into production may be risky: if the game
was a success, employees would get a large bonus, but if the game was a failure, there would be firings.
The intention of adding this information was to increase one’s baseline desire to have a voice in the
final decision.
Finally, the voice manipulation was presented. Depending on the type of voice experienced,
participants read one of four descriptions of how the company’s boss wanted to use the opinions of
employees during the decision-making process (Personal Voice: “The company’s boss asks for your
opinion…”; Group Voice: “The company’s boss asks for your fellow employee’s opinion, to serve as a
representative of the opinions of your entire team…You did not have a chance to discuss your opinion
with your team’s representative”; Composite Voice: “The company’s boss asks your fellow employee’s
opinion, to serve as a representative of the opinions of your entire team…You discussed your opinions
with your team’s representative”; No Voice: “The company’s boss does not ask for your opinion or
your fellow employee’s opinion during the decision-making process; the boss makes the decision
alone”).
Participants then completed a series of questions with the purpose of assessing the potential
effects voice has on a variety of employee’s perceptions and expectations. Participants were asked to
what extent they were allowed to voice their opinion and whether they have control over the situation.
Next, participants responded to two items adapted from McAllister’s (1995) cognition-based trust scale
(Colquitt et al., 2012). The two trust items are: “I see no reason to doubt my boss’ competence to make
the right decision” and “I can rely on my boss not to make the wrong decision.” Participants’
responses to the two trust items were averaged to form a composite trust score (Cronbach's alpha =
.77).
Participants then endorsed the extent to which they would feel certain about the final outcome
of the decision to put the game into production. Furthermore, participants indicated whether they
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would work hard on producing the new computer game and how likely they would quit the job.
Responses for the previous items were on a seven-point scale with higher values representing high
agreement. Participants were also asked the extent to which they expected either receiving the large
bonus or being fired would occur in the future (-7 = “I will be fired”, 0 = “Unsure about what will
happen”, +7 = “I will receive the large bonus”; recoded on a 15-point scale where low numbers
representing certainty of failure and high numbers representing certainty of success). The previous
item was included as a measure of one's certainty of the consequences of the decision being made, with
a belief in receiving the bonus or being fired reflecting certainty in receiving either positive or negative
consequences, respectively. Once the items were completed, participants were debriefed and released
from the session.
Results and Discussion
Primary Analyses. To test Hypothesis 1, that the directness of voice one experiences
differentially affects one's perceptions of certainty and group-based behavior depending on the size of
the group involved in the decision-making process, multiple 4 (Voice: Personal, Composite, Group, No
Voice) x 2 (Group Size: 2, 20) between-participant ANOVAs were run on the various dependent
variables (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations).
For participants’ responses to whether they were allowed to voice their opinion, a significant
main effect for Voice was found, F (3, 152) = 40.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .44. Tukey HSD indicated that the
Personal Voice (M = 6.28) and Composite Voice (M = 6.00) conditions were not different from each
other, while the No Voice (M = 3.78) and Group Voice (M = 2.95) conditions were not different from
each other. Those in the No Voice control group and the Group Voice group felt they had less voice
than those in the Composite or Personal Voice groups. All other comparisons were found to be
significantly different. There was not a significant main effect for Group Size, F (1, 152) = .34, p > .05,
ηp2 = .00, or for the Voice x Group Size interaction, F (3, 152) = .59, p > .05, ηp2 = .01.
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Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations of Participants’ Responses: Study 1 (N = 160)
DV

Voice?

Control?

Trust?

Certain
Decision?

Certain
Outcome?

Work hard?

Quit?

Group Size

Voice
No Voice

Group Voice

Composite Voice

Personal Voice

2

4.05 (2.28)

3.05 (1.76)

5.80 (1.24)

6.40 (.82)

20

3.50 (2.24)

2.85 (2.06)

6.20 (.95)

6.15 (.88)

2

2.70 (1.26)

2.90 (1.48)

3.80 (1.36)

4.35 (1.18)

20

1.95 (.83)

2.35 (1.76)

3.70 (.86)

4.00 (1.08)

2

3.98 (1.46)

3.73 (.97)

4.75 (1.22)

4.33 (1.35)

20

3.80 (1.29)

3.75 (1.31)

4.28 (.91)

4.75 (.94)

2

4.20 (1.36)

3.55 (1.23)

4.20 (1.20)

4.95 (1.50)

20

3.70 (1.53)

4.00 (1.62)

4.35 (1.31)

4.95 (1.43)

2

9.05 (1.47)

8.45 (1.50)

9.25 (2.05)

9.80 (1.96)

20

8.70 (2.03)

9.50 (2.19)

10.10 (1.94)

10.35 (2.58)

2

6.25 (.91)

6.05 (1.05)

6.35 (.81)

6.70 (.57)

20

6.50 (.61)

5.95 (1.39)

6.55 (.69)

6.55 (.51)

2

2.20 (1.24)

2.05 (1.05)

1.85 (.88)

1.65 (.88)

20

2.25 (1.02)

2.30 (1.26)

2.15 (.81)

1.80 (1.01)
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For participants’ responses to whether they had control over their situation, a significant main
effect for Voice, F (3, 152) = 19.71, p < .001, ηp2 = .28, was found. Tukey HSD indicated that the No
Voice (M = 2.33) and Group Voice (M = 2.63) conditions were not significantly different from each
other, and the Composite Voice (M = 3.75) and Personal Voice (M = 4.18) conditions were not
different from each other; all other pairwise comparisons were significantly different. Participants
either having no voice or experiencing group voice felt they had less control than participants
experiencing either composite voice or personal voice. A significant main effect for Group Size, F
(1,152) = 4.82, p < .05, ηp2 = .03, was found. Participants in the 2-person group (M = 3.44) felt they had
more control over their situation than those in the 20-person group (M = 3.00). Finally, there was not a
significant Voice x Group Size interaction, F (3, 152) = .49, p > .05, ηp2 = .01.
For participants’ trust in the company’s boss, a significant main effect for Voice was found, F
(3,152) = 4.82, p < .01, ηp2 = .09. Tukey HSD indicated that the No Voice (M = 3.89) and Group
Voice (M = 3.74) conditions were not significantly different from each other. The No Voice condition
was not different from the Composite Voice (M = 4.51) and Personal Voice (M = 4.54) conditions,
which were not different from each other. Participants experiencing group voice trusted their boss less
than participants experiencing either composite voice or personal voice. There was not a significant
main effect for Group Size, F (1, 152) = .07, p > .05, ηp2 = .00, or a significant Voice x Group Size
interaction, F (3, 152) = .99, p > .05, ηp2 = .02.
For participants’ certainty about the final outcome of the decision, a significant main effect for
Voice was found, F (3,152) = 5.44, p < .001, ηp2 = .10. Tukey HSD indicates that the Group Voice (M
= 3.78) and No Voice (M = 3.95) conditions were significantly different from the Personal Voice (M =
4.95) condition. None of these was significantly different from the Composite Voice (M = 4.28)
condition. Participants who were given a personal voice were more certain about the outcome of the
decision than those either given group voice or no voice at all. There was not a significant main effect
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for Group Size, F (1, 152) = .01, p > .05, ηp2 = .00, or a significant Voice x Group Size interaction, F
(3, 152) = .80, p > .05, ηp2 = .02.
For participants’ certainty of the consequences of the decision, a significant main effect for
Voice was found, F (3,152) = 3.31, p < .05, ηp2 = .06. Tukey HSD indicated that the Personal Voice (M
= 10.08) condition was different from the No Voice (M = 8.88) condition, while not significantly
different from Composite Voice (M = 9.68) and Group Voice (M = 8.98) conditions. Furthermore,
Composite Voice was not different from either Group Voice or No Voice. Finally, Group Voice and
No Voice were not different from each other. Participants who were given more of a personal voice
than others were more certain that the game would be a success and they would receive the bonus
relative to those who did not have a voice. There was not a significant main effect for Group Size, F
(1,152) = 2.77, p > .05, ηp2 = .02, or a significant Voice x Group Size interaction, F (3, 152) = .96, p >
.05, ηp2 = .02.
To assess whether experiencing more or less direct voice in differing sized groups affects group
members’ group-based behavior, a Voice x Group Size ANOVA on participants' expected effort in
working hard on producing the computer game found a significant main effect for Voice, F (3,152) =
3.72, p < .05, ηp2 = .07. Tukey HSD indicate that the Group Voice (M = 6.00) condition was not
different from either the No Voice (M = 6.38) or Composite Voice (M = 6.45) conditions. However,
Group Voice was significantly different from the Personal Voice (M = 6.63) condition. Although the
means for all conditions were high on the scale, participants experiencing group voice believed they
would put forth less effort than those experiencing personal voice. All other comparisons were not
significant. There was not a significant main effect for Group Size, F (1, 152) = .13, p > .05, ηp2 = .00,
or a significant Voice x Group Size interaction, F (3, 152) = .56, p > .05, ηp2 = .01.
Finally, for participants’ belief that they would quit the job, there were no significant main
effects for either the Voice, F (3, 152) = 1.93, p > .05, ηp2 = .04, or Group Size, F (1, 152) = 1.33, p >
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.05, ηp2 = .01, conditions, and the Voice x Group Size interaction was also not significant, F (3, 152) =
.12, p > .05, ηp2 = .00. Neither the type of voice experienced nor the size of one’s group seemed to
effect participants’ belief they would want to quit the job.
The findings of the current study suggests that the group voice utilized in this study does not
represent an opportunity to experience voice. Group voice consistently appears to be distinct from
personal voice. Those who experienced personal voice reported experiencing more voice (Shapiro &
Brett, 2005) and control (Terwel et al., 2010; Thibaut & Walker, 1975) than those with either an
indirect voice or no voice. Those with personal voice also expressed more certainty than those
experiencing either group voice or no voice (Desai et al., 2011; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002).
Additionally, those that experienced personal voice were able to trust more than those experiencing
either group voice or no voice, supporting Colquitt et al.'s (2012) model and further suggesting the
similar experience of group voice and no voice.
The results also showed that participants believed they would put forth less effort for the group
when experiencing group voice compared to personal voice. In other words, those experiencing group
voice seem to be less motivated to benefit the group compared to those experiencing personal voice.
Consistent with past work on voice (e.g., Lind et al., 1990), experiencing personal voice positively
affects various psychological experiences and motivates positive group behaviors. However, there did
not appear to be a difference between the projected effort for those in the Personal Voice and No Voice
conditions. This is inconsistent with a vast literature finding an increase in effort and behavior when
experiencing personal voice compared to no voice (e.g., Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994; Desai et al.,
2011; Thibaut & Walker, 1975).
This similarity in expected effort between those experiencing personal voice and no voice may
be due to the commonality of the situation used to represent the lack of voice. Specifically, participants
in the No Voice condition were led to believe that the boss was to make the decision without employee
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input. The boss may represent a reliable, competent, and informed person to make the decision. The
non-significant difference in participants' trust in the boss between the No Voice and Personal Voice
conditions support this possibility. Therefore, despite the No Voice group recognizing they did not
have a voice and believing they lacked control and certainty, trust in the boss may compensate. The
significant difference in trust between the Personal Voice and Group Voice groups may suggest that
having a singular representative express an opinion may bias the boss to make a poorer decision that
does not have the entire group's interests at heart. Consequently, participants predicted they would put
forth slightly less effort when the boss could have been corrupted by a single, biased individual.
Unique to this study was the inclusion of a composite form of voice, where one experiences
personal voice prior to group voice. The results suggest that in most cases, the experience of composite
voice is similar to that of personal voice and yet distinct from group voice: the heightened sense of
fairness, control, and certainty that comes from personal voice is maintained after one turns over voice
to another. This suggests that the experience of personal voice trumps that of group voice, further
differentiating the two constructs. Taking the findings concerning the various types of voice as a whole,
the assertions Terwel et al. (2010) made about group voice were generally supported, in that those
experiencing group voice have less control. On the other hand, Terwel et al.'s findings that group voice
can fulfill the relational needs of group members' above and beyond those not having a voice was not
found, in the case of less trust in the decision-maker. A possible explanation for this may be that this
was a survey in which participants responded to a hypothetical scenario.
Finally, the current study failed to find any group size effects: the size of the group did not
matter when experiencing different forms of voice. It has been suggested that the size of a group can
be important in affecting one’s perceived importance (Latané, 1981) and the likelihood one’s voice
would even be heard (Waller et al., 2011). The largest group size chosen for the current experiment
(i.e., 20 people) may have been of insufficient number to signal to participants the fulfillment of their
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needs was in jeopardy. An additional follow-up investigation in which group sizes were set at 5 people
or 50 people did find that group size interacted with the experience of voice (Schroeder, Poepsel, &
Clay, 2013) to affect perceptions of the amount of voice one has and how fair the decision-making
process is, with more perceived voice and higher perceptions of fairness for those with more direct
input in the decision in small groups. Waller et al. (2011) found evidence that being a member of a
relatively large decision-making group (i.e., 12 members) lead to lowered perceptions of conversational
participation (not actual participation) and satisfaction compared to when group members first
belonged to smaller subgroups before returning to the larger group. Smaller groups may simply be a
source of perceptual efficacy rather than true decision-influence. Future work on the effects of group
size would do well to specify the limitations on the increase in group sizes to help establish any
relationship among the various forms of voice one may experience.
Correlations and Mediation. The previous results paint a consistent picture regarding the
distinction between the experience of having more or less direct voice. To test Hypothesis 2, that
certainty mediates the relationship between the directness of one's voice and group behavior,
correlational analyses were run among participants' responses to the various questionnaire items and
the experimental conditions. The primary dependent variable of interest was participants' expected
effort given for the benefit of the group. The previous analyses indicated that more effort was expected
to be given when experiencing personal voice compared to when experiencing group voice. Therefore,
to understand what drives this difference in effort, only the Personal Voice and Group Voice conditions
were used for analyses.
Point-biserial correlations (see Table 2) showed that having more direct voice was positively
related to perceptions of control (r = .49, p < .001), trust (r = .33, p < .01), certainty of the outcome of
the decision (r = .38, p < .001), and certainty of the success of the decision (r = .26, p < .05).
Furthermore, the more direct voice one was allowed to have was positively related to greater purported
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Table 2 (N = 80)
Intercorrelations with Personal Voice and Group Voice Conditions: Study 1 (N = 80)

1
1. Voice Conditions

2

3

4

5

6

7

--

(PV = 1, GV = 0)
2. Voice?

.75***

--

3. Control?

.49*** .73***

4. Trust Boss?

.33**

5. Certain Outcome?

.38*** .44*** .41*** .52***

.27*

-.31**

---

6. Certain Success?

.26*

.24*

.25*

7. Work Hard?

.32**

.20

.05

.23*

.28*

.32**

--

-.21

-.19

-.09

-.23*

-.18

-.13

-.53***

8. Quit Job?

Note. *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001
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.41*** .48***

--

effort towards the success of the group (r = .32, p < .01). All of these findings are consistent with the
ANOVA results. Of particular interest are the factors that are related to one's expected effort, which for
the current purposes can serve as the primary behavioral outcome variable. The current results found
that trust in the boss (r = .23, p < .05), certainty of the outcome of the decision (r = .28, p < .05) and
one's certainty of success (r = .32, p < .01) were positively related to expected effort, suggesting trust
and certainty may serve as mediators to the voice-behavior relationship.
To explore the possible mediation of voice on expected effort by trust and certainty, a multiple
mediation test (with mediators operating in serial; Hayes, 2012) was conducted with trust preceding
certainty, consistent with Colquitt et al.'s (2012) model and fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001; Van
den Bos, 2001), and certainty directly predicting behavioral outcome, following Desai et al. (2011).
Both forms of certainty followed trust and were entered separately as potential mediators, with the most
relevant relationship between trust and the two forms of certainty being whether trust in the boss to
make a good decision predicts certainty of what decision would be made, followed by a similarly
relevant relationship existing between having participants' certainty of the outcome of the decision
predicting the certainty of the consequences of that decision. The unstandardized regression
coefficients for the direct effects of the relevant relationships are: Personal/Group Voice on expected
group effort, B = .63, t (78) = 2.96, p < .01; Personal/Group Voice on trust, B = .80, t (78) = 3.10, p <
.05; trust on certainty of decision outcome, B = .66, t (78) = 5.33, p < .001; certainty of decision on
certainty of success, B = .67, t (78) = 4.83, p < .001; and certainty of success on expected group effort,
B = .15, t (78) = 3.02, p < .01. To test the indirect effect of this serial-mediation, bootstrapping
procedures (10,000 samples) revealed that the estimate of the indirect effect (M = .022, SE = .02) was
significantly different from zero (p < .05, 95% confidence interval = .003 to .112; see Figure 1). With
all mediators included in the model, the direct effect of voice on expected behavior remained
significant, B = .44, t (78) = 2.17, p < .05, suggesting partial mediation. When assessing the unique
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B = .66, 5.33***
(B = .56, 3.49***)

Certainty of
Decision

B = .67, 4.83***
(B = .49, 2.68**)

Certainty of
Success

Trust Boss

B = .15, 3.02**
(B = .10, 1.59ns)

B = .80, 3.10*

Personal Voice = 1
Group Voice = 0

Work Hard?
(B = .63, 2.96**)
B = .44, 2.17*
M = .022, SE = .02
95% CI: .003, .112

Figure 1. Study 1: Trust and Certainty Partially Mediates the Voice – Effort Relationship

27

influence of each variable, after accounting for previous predictors, the coefficients are:
Personal/Group Voice on trust, B = .80, t (78) = 3.10, p < .05; trust on certainty of the decision, B =
.56, t (77) = 3.49, p < .001; certainty of decision on certainty of success, B = .49, t (76) = 2.68, p < .01;
and certainty of success on expected group effort, B = .10, t (75) = 1.59, p = .117. When including the
influence of all of the variables, the certainty of success became a non-significant predictor of expected
effort. Despite this, the amount of variance it does explain continues to contribute to the partial
mediation found. These results should be interpreted with caution.
Direct voice in the decision-making process predicted higher levels of trust in the boss. This
increased trust predicted more certainty in the outcome of the decision, which in turn predicted
increased certainty that the decision will lead to a successful outcome. Finally, the more one was
certain that the long-term consequence of the decision was going to be a success the higher expected
effort to be put forth in making the decision a success. Therefore, the current study supports the
hypothesis that one of the reasons why having more voice leads to more positive group behaviors is
because of the increased sense of trust (Terwel et al., 2010) and how trust may serve as a mechanism to
affect one's certainty of the situation (Colquitt et al., 2012). However, the current study expands on past
work (e.g., Desai et al., 2011) by revealing that there are different forms certainty can take, with each
contributing an important level of explanatory power when trying to understand how the experience of
voice affects group members' behaviors.
Conclusions
The purpose of Study 1 was to test any experiential differences among the various forms of
voice. In achieving this goal, Study 1 provides evidence that important factors in the experience of
group voice is the different amount of certainty that is experienced compared to when group members
experience personal voice. The purpose of Study 2 is to build on this relationship and to examine in a
live situation (rather than scenario) whether the amount of certainty can be beneficial or detrimental
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depending on the type of person experiencing the certainty.
Study 2
The current study adapted the procedure of Desai et al.’s (2011) Study 3. Voice was
manipulated between-participant (Personal, Group, and No Voice); the Composite Voice condition was
removed because the results of Study 1 suggest that the behavior of group members experiencing
composite voice was primarily influenced by the allowance of personal voice (given the similarity of
the effects of personal and composite voice).
Participants’ level of risk aversion was measured in order to serve as a quasi-independent
variable and potential moderator of the relationship between group members' perceived certainty and
group behavior. Participants’ perceived certainty was measured, and participants engaged in a timed
brainstorming task in which behavior was objectively measured. Participants were randomly assigned
to receive one of three forms of negotiation to decide the payoff for the task they were to complete. All
participants were given an offer to work for an imaginary company brainstorming uses for an object. If
experiencing personal voice, participants were allowed to personally present a counter-offer in
response to an original offer during a negotiation process. If experiencing group voice, all participants
were under the belief that a group representative will make a counter offer on behalf of everyone in the
session. If experiencing no voice, participants were not allowed to negotiate.
Participants
One-hundred fifty (108 female) undergraduate students from the University of Arkansas
participated in this study for course credit and a chance in a lottery for a gift card. Two participants
were removed from all analyses because of invalid protocol experiences, leaving the final sample size
at 148 participants.
Procedure
Participants entered the lab, were directed to separate cubicles, and were given an informed
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consent form to read and complete. They were asked to complete a questionnaire assessing risk
aversion across various domains (Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002). A 36-item version of the Weber et al.
questionnaire was utilized as a scale for risk behavior (i.e., “…indicate your likelihood of engaging in
each activity”; 1 = “very unlikely”, 5 = “very likely”; Cronbach’s alpha = .84), with a total score
calculated by reverse scoring all items, resulting in higher scores suggesting more risk aversion, and
averaging these reverse scored items. Weber et al.’s risk aversion questionnaire contains six sub-scales
regarding risk aversion in domains of ethics, investment, gambling, health/safety, recreational, and
social, providing for a broad assessment of risk aversion. The Investment subscale was not included due
to the low relevance the questions have for the lives of college students (e.g., “Investing 10% of your
annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund”). To also assess risk aversion, participants
responded to a scenario used in Desai et al. (2011). Desai et al. measured level of risk aversion by
having participants hypothetically invest in a risky business proposition, with the less they invested
indicating more risk aversion. Participants were asked to choose the portion of an imagined $500 stake
they wish to invest. It was described that there was a 67% chance that the investment would fail and a
33% chance the investment will succeed. If the investment fails, participants would lose the amount
invested, and if the investment succeeds, participants would receive 3.5 times the amount they invested.
Level of risk aversion was the amount of $500 not invested (500 – Investment), with higher amounts
suggesting a more risk averse individual. These responses were converted to a 5-point scale by dividing
participants' responses by 100 and the converted score was combined with the Weber et al. total score.
This composite risk aversion item was used as a risk aversion quasi-independent variable by a mediansplit.
After completing this measure, participants were read the following instructions:
…today you are going to be working on a task that measures performance while being a
member of a group. The participants in this session will be a group and each of you is a
member.
Performance on the task today will allow each of you to earn points for your group.
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Points are worth chances in a lottery for Best Buy gift cards at the end of the semester. The
more points you have, the more chances in the lottery you will receive. Forty points equals 1
chance.
Each group member will separately earn points for the group. At the end of the task, all
group members’ earned points will be added together and divided equally back to every
member to determine lottery chances. In other words, every group member will receive the
same number of chances in the lottery based on the group’s total number of earned points.
Therefore, the number of chances in the lottery you will receive will depend not only on your
performance but on the performance of the entire group.
However, your performance will not always guarantee earning points; there is a
percentage chance you will earn zero points at various points during the task.
Next, participants read the following task description (adapted from Desai et al., 2011):
Your group has been made an offer by Smith & Co. to brainstorm uses for a common,
everyday object. However, their competitor, Craig & Co., would also like to make your group
an offer for doing the same task. These companies are interested in studying how groups affect
creativity. Your group can work for either Smith & Co. or for Craig & Co.
The researcher for this session will serve as a representative of Craig & Co. Before we
can begin, a decision has to be made regarding how many points each generated object use will
be worth and she will have to choose to negotiate with you in one of three ways.
The first way the Craig & Co. representative may negotiate with you and your group is
to allow you and your fellow group members to negotiate with her directly by making counteroffers. After you and your fellow group members are allowed to make direct counter-offers,
Craig & Co.’s representative will take all of the offers into consideration and make a final offer.
All group members can then accept the final offer, which means your group will brainstorm
uses for Craig & Co. at the wage agreed to; if all group members reject the final offer, your
group will brainstorm uses for Smith & Co. at the rate offered by them.
The second way the Craig & Co. representative may negotiate with you and your group
is to allow a randomly chosen representative for your group to make a counter-offer on the
other members’ behalf with no contact or input from the other members. After the
representative for your group is allowed to make a counter-offer, Craig & Co.’s representative
will consider the offer and make a final offer. Your representative can then accept the final
offer, which means your group will brainstorm uses for Craig & Co. at the wage agreed to; if
your representative rejects the final offer, your group will brainstorm uses for Smith & Co. at
the rate offered by them.
The third option for the Craig & Co. representative is to not negotiate with you and your
group and to have Craig & Co.’s initial offer be the final offer. All group members can then
accept this final offer, which means your group will brainstorm uses for Craig & Co. at the
wage offered; if all group members reject the final offer, your group will brainstorm uses for
Smith & Co. at the rate offered by them.
Please note that in the past the going rate for this task was 50 points per generated use,
with a 50% chance of receiving points per use. 40 points equals 1 chance in the lottery.
Participants were probed with questions assessing comprehension of the description of the task
(e.g., “How is Craig & Co. going to allow you to negotiate with them?; Will you earn points for every
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object use generated?); incorrect responses were corrected to ensure full comprehension.
Participants helped the researcher brainstorm uses for a “bowl” to familiarize themselves with
the task. Depending on condition, the researcher led participants to believe the choice of how to
negotiate was entirely up to the researcher (e.g., Personal Voice: “Today...I think I'm going to have all
of you negotiate with me”; Group Voice: “Today...I think I'm going to have one of you negotiate with
me”; No Voice: “Today...I think I'm not going to have you negotiate with me”). In this way,
participants were aware of all possible forms of negotiation before learning which one they would be
experiencing (as recommended by Van den Bos, 1999). Participants then presented with the company's
offer (5 points per object use with a 25% chance of receiving points) and either presented counteroffers directly to the researcher (Personal Voice), were told their group's representative would be
providing a counter-offer to the researcher and were asked the current date (Group Voice), or were
asked the current date (No Voice).
After either having a direct voice, indirect voice, or no voice at all, participants responded to
various questionnaire items. Participants were asked to assess their level of voice, “I was allowed to
voice my opinion about how many points each unique object use will be worth.” Participants also
completed items designed to measure perceptions of procedural justice with regards to general
assessment of fairness and the quality of treatment during the decision-making process (adapted from
Blader & Tyler, 2003; further adapted by Desai et al., 2011). Items include, “My views were
considered when decisions were being made,” “The situation was handled in a fair manner,” and “How
would you rate the overall fairness with which issues and decisions that came up today were handled?”;
responses were made on a seven-point scale with appropriate anchors. The items assessing perceptions
of fairness were averaged to create an Averaged Fairness score (Cronbach's alpha = .94).
Next, participants completed items measuring perceived control (“I feel in control of this
situation”) and certainty. First, participants were asked to assess their perceived certainty about the
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outcome of the decision needed to be made, “I am certain how many points each generated object use
is worth.” Adapted from Desai et al. (2011), participants were also asked, “I am certain how many
points I will earn by the end of today’s session.” Additional certainty items were adapted from
Thompson and Parker (2007). These items offered a more generic assessment of the level of
uncertainty in the current environment. Participants responded to the following items: “I feel uncertain
about what is required of me to complete the upcoming task,” “I feel taken by surprise,” “I feel I am
unable to function well on the task I am going to complete,” “Uncertainty will interfere with my
performance,” and “I feel I have all the information needed to complete the upcoming task” (reverse
scale). Responses were measured on a seven-point scale with appropriate anchors. These items were
reverse coded to make higher scores represent more certainty and averaged to create a General
Certainty score (Cronbach’s alpha = .83).
When all participants had completed the items, the researcher then explained to participants that
it would take some time to figure out the final offers each company would present. Therefore,
participants were asked to complete the brainstorming task prior to knowing the final offers; the
researcher made participants believe that points would still be given to everyone based on the rate for
the company that the group would ultimately choose. By having this procedural order, any effect of
voice and perceived uncertainty on performance behavior can remain pure. If final offers were
presented and accepted prior to performance, all participants (regardless of condition) would have
shared the same level of heightened certainty, given the fact that exact point and percentage values
would have been known; any differential effect voice might have had on certainty and performance
may have been washed out.
Participants were then given instructions on how to complete the task. Adapted from Harkins
and Petty (1982), participants took part in a social loafing task in which they were asked to generate
uses for an object. A social loafing task was chosen to minimize confounding motivations in
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participants’ performance (i.e., social presentation concerns) and maximize the cooperative
interdependence of individual participants’ behavior. In this brainstorming task, participants were told
that they shared the responsibility for coming up with uses for the object with all members of the
group. Participants believed their individual performance would not be measured because their uses,
once generated, would be put into a common pool so that participants could not be associated with his
or her creations.
After being told the description and having any final questions answered, participants were told
to begin working on the task. The researcher instructed that participants' task was to come up with uses
for the object and to write only one use on a single slip of paper and to place the slip in a container
sitting next to the participant. Participants were told to keep coming up with uses until a set amount of
time had passed in which no one came up with a new use. Participants believed the researcher would be
tracking this and would let them know when the task was complete. In reality, the researcher timed the
task and gave participants 12 minutes to generate as many uses as they could and ended the task
regardless of participants' response rate. Finally, the participants believed that when the task was done,
they were to empty their responses into a box so that the researcher could determine the group's total.
The researcher actually collected the containers without allowing the mixture of responses. After the
allotted time has passed, the task ended and participants were fully debriefed and released from the
session.
Results and Discussion
Primary Analyses. To test Hypothesis 1, that the directness of voice one experiences
differentially affects one's behavior depending on one's level of risk aversion, multiple 3 (Voice:
Personal, Group, No Voice) x 2 (Risk Aversion: High, Low) between-participant ANOVAs were run
on the various dependent variables (see Table 3 for means and standard deviations).
For participants' perceptions of being given a voice, there was a main effect for Voice, F (2,142)
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Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations of Participants’ Responses: Study 2 (N = 148)
DV

Allowed Voice

Risk
Aversion

Low
High

Views Considered

Low
High

Composite Fair

Low
High

Control

Low
High

Certain Points
Worth

Low
High

Certain Points
Earn

Low
High

General Certainty

Low
High

Object Uses

Low
High

Voice
Personal Voice

Group Voice

No Voice

6.04
(1.31)
6.57
(.73)
5.42
(1.30)
5.48
(1.75)
5.81
(.96)
5.89
(1.39)
4.35
(1.16)
4.61
(1.83)
3.12
(1.51)
3.57
(2.11)
2.69
(1.46)
3.26
(2.09)
4.90
(1.14)
5.05
(1.45)
18.69
(7.65)
19.91
(8.07)

1.77
(1.45)
1.36
(1.03)
2.23
(1.63)
1.46
(1.00)
3.30
(1.15)
2.95
(1.97)
2.14
(1.39)
1.75
(1.24)
2.41
(1.68)
2.14
(1.84)
1.91
(.97)
1.93
(1.72)
4.58
(1.27)
4.75
(1.36)
22.77
(8.28)
25.25
(13.41)

1.52
(1.22)
2.82
(2.44)
1.89
(1.65)
2.73
(2.19)
2.72
(1.91)
3.20
(2.25)
1.78
(1.31)
2.50
(1.79)
4.56
(2.31)
3.82
(2.34)
2.15
(1.43)
2.00
(1.38)
4.80
(1.32)
4.70
(1.33)
23.85
(7.65)
22.09
(9.58)
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= 158.65, p < .001, ηp2 = .69. Tukey HSD indicated that the Personal Voice (M = 6.29) condition was
significantly different from the Group Voice (M = 1.54) and No Voice (M = 2.10) conditions. Group
Voice and No Voice conditions were not different from each other. Those who experienced personal
voice reported that they had more voice than those experiencing group voice. There was also a
significant main effect for Risk Aversion, F (1,142) = 3.96, p < .05, ηp2 = .03. Those high in risk
aversion felt they were allowed more of a voice (M = 3.58) than those low in risk aversion (M = 3.11).
Both main effects were qualified by a significant Voice x Risk Aversion interaction, F (2,142) = 4.40, p
< .05, ηp2 = .06. Simple effects tests indicate that in the No Voice condition, those high in risk aversion
perceived to have been allowed significantly more voice (M = 2.82) than those low in risk aversion (M
= 1.52), F (1,142) = 10.00, p < .01, ηp2 = .07. There were no significant differences in perceptions of
voice in either the Personal Voice or Group Voice conditions dependent on one's level of risk aversion.
For participants' belief that their views had been considered, there was a main effect for Voice,
F (2,142) = 73.40, p < .001, ηp2 = .51. Tukey HSD indicated that the Personal Voice (M = 5.45)
condition was significantly different from the Group Voice (M = 1.80) and No Voice (M = 2.27)
conditions. Group Voice and No Voice conditions were not different from each other. Those who
experienced personal voice believed their views were considered more than those provided group voice
or no voice at all. There was not a significant main effect for Risk Aversion, F (1,142) = .03, p > .05,
ηp2 = .00. However, the Voice main effect was qualified by a significant Voice x Risk Aversion
interaction, F (2,142) = 3.06, p < .05, ηp2 = .04. Simple effects tests indicate that in the Group Voice
condition, those low in risk aversion believed their views were considered marginally more (M = 2.23)
than those high in risk aversion (M = 1.46), F (1,142) = 2.80, p = .097, ηp2 = .02, while in the No Voice
condition, those high in risk aversion believed their views were considered marginally more (M = 2.73)
than those low in risk aversion (M = 1.89), F (1,142) = 3.33, p = .07, ηp2 = .02. There were no
differences in beliefs about having one's views considered in the Personal Voice condition dependent
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on level of risk aversion.
For participants' perceptions of fairness (as measured by the Averaged Fairness score), there
was a main effect for Voice, F (2,142) = 45.63, p < .001, ηp2 = .39. Tukey HSD indicated that the
Personal Voice (M = 5.85) condition was significantly different than the Group Voice (M = 3.10) and
No Voice (M = 2.94) conditions. Group Voice and No Voice conditions were not different from each
other. The experience of personal voice led to increased perceptions of fairness compared to group
voice and no voice. There was not a significant main effect for Risk Aversion, F (1,142) = .07, p > .05,
ηp2 = .00, or a Voice x Risk Aversion interaction, F (2,142) = .75, p > .05, ηp2 = .01.
For participants' perceptions of control, there was a main effect for Voice, F (2,142) = 45.78, p
< .001, ηp2 = .39. Tukey HSD indicated that the Personal Voice (M = 4.47) condition was significantly
different from the Group Voice (M = 1.92) and No Voice (M = 2.10) conditions. The Group Voice and
No Voice conditions were not different. The experience of personal voice leads to more perceived
control over the situation. There was not a significant main effect of Risk Aversion, F (1,142) = .69, p
> .05, ηp2 = .01, or a Voice x Risk Aversion interaction, F (2,142) = 1.79, p > .05, ηp2 = .03.
Regarding participants' certainty of how many points each object use would be worth, there was
a main effect for Voice, F (2,142) = 11.39, p < .001, ηp2 = .14. Tukey HSD indicated that the Personal
Voice (M = 3.33) and No Voice (M = 4.22) conditions were not different from each other, and the
Group Voice (M = 2.26) condition was significantly lower than both Personal Voice and No Voice.
Participants were less certain about the outcome of the decision being made when experiencing group
voice compared to personal voice and no voice. Interestingly, because participants in the No Voice
condition were not able to negotiate with the researcher, their certainty of how much each object use
would be worth may reflect the fact that they had been given a final offer. Therefore, group voice
appears to decrease one’s level of certainty of the outcome of the decision. There was not a significant
main effect for Risk Aversion, F (1,142) = .32, p > .05, ηp2 = .00, or a significant Voice x Risk
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Aversion interaction, F (2,142) = 1.11, p > .05, ηp2 = .02.
Regarding participants' certainty of how many points they would earn by the end of the task,
there was a main effect for Voice, F (2,142) = 6.60, p < .01, ηp2 = .09. Tukey HSD indicated that the
Personal Voice (M = 2.96) condition was significantly higher than the Group Voice (M = 1.92) and No
Voice (M = 2.08) conditions. Group Voice and No Voice conditions were not different from each other.
Despite being certain about how many points each object use would be worth, participants in the No
Voice condition were less certain about how many points they would ultimately earn. However, once
again those who experienced personal voice were more certain than those experiencing group voice and
no voice. There was not a significant main effect for Risk Aversion, F (1,142) = .33, p > .05, ηp2 = .00,
or a significant Voice x Risk Aversion interaction, F (2,142) = .71, p > .05, ηp2 = .01.
For participants' overall sense of certainty regarding the situation (i.e., General Certainty score),
there was not a significant main effect for Voice, F (2,142) = .73, p > .05, ηp2 = .01, or for Risk
Aversion. F (1,142) = .11, p > .05, ηp2 = .00. Furthermore, there was not a significant Voice x Risk
Aversion interaction, F (2,142) = .16, p > .05, ηp2 = .00. Neither one's experience of voice nor one's
level of risk aversion affected the overall sense of certainty of one's situation.
Finally, to test whether one's experience of voice and/or one's level of risk aversion affects
group behavior, a 3 (Voice) x 2 (Risk Aversion) ANOVA was run on participants' total number of
generated object uses. Results found a significant main effect for Voice, F (2,142) = 3.36, p < .05, ηp2 =
.05. Tukey HSD indicated that those in the Personal Voice (M = 19.27) condition generated
significantly fewer object uses than those participants in the Group Voice (M = 24.16) condition. The
No Voice (M = 23.06) condition was not significantly different from either the Personal Voice or
Group Voice conditions. Participants who experienced the relatively high levels of voice put forth less
effort than those who experienced an indirect voice. Furthermore, the same amount of effort was put
forth by those that did not have a voice during decision-making and those who simply had an indirect
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voice or a personal voice. There was not a significant main effect for Risk Aversion, F (1,142) = .17, p
> .05, ηp2 = .00, or a significant Voice x Risk Aversion interaction, F (2,142) = .65, p > .05, ηp2 = .01.
The results of the current study replicated the findings of Study 1, in that having an indirect
voice in the decision-making process is a distinctive experience compared to having a personal voice.
As in Study 1, the current investigation found that experiencing personal voice increased one's sense of
control and certainty compared to either having someone present a voice on your behalf or not having a
voice. An additional feature of this study was the inclusion of a test of perceived fairness. The results
showed that just as having personal voice leads to more control and certainty, so does it lead to
increased perceptions of fairness. This suggests that having another person serve as a representative
voice on one's behalf does not represent and is not perceived as a fair situation. This is in contrast to the
conclusions made by Terwel et al. (2010). In their experiments, participants experiencing group voice
expressed higher judgments of procedural fairness compared to when not provided a voice. This effect
was not found in the current study, with participants in the Group Voice and No Voice conditions
experiencing the same level of procedural fairness. The similarity between the Group Voice and No
Voice conditions in both Study 1 and Study 2 begs the question as to whether the current
operationalizations of group voice reflects the construct studied by Terwel and colleagues.
An important distinction between Terwel et al.'s (2010) group voice and the form of group
voice in the current studies may be the level of analysis at which the decision-making process occurred.
In the Terwel et al. studies, participants believed a decision had to be made with two contrasting groups
vying for influence over the decision-makers. Terwel et al.'s group voice is an intergroup voice. In
Study 1 of Terwel et al., both sides of the argument were allowed a representative voice, while in the
no voice groups, neither of the interest groups were allowed a representative voice. Consequently,
Terwel et al.'s participants' judgments of fairness, trust, and level of cooperation were based on the
notion that the decision would either be based on the combination of two contrasting viewpoints or on
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neither of the viewpoints. Interestingly, Terwel et al.'s Study 2 found that if participants believed
groups were provided an unequal amount of voice (i.e., only one of the two groups having a say in the
decision), the situation was considered significantly less fair than when both groups, even if the group
having voice was one's own group, are provided group voice. Therefore, in order to have group
members believe having an indirect voice is as fair of a procedure as having a direct, personal voice,
this indirect, group voice may have to be contrasted with at least one additional indirect outgroup voice.
In contrast, the current investigations may represent intragroup voice: one representative providing a
single representative interest. Although an attempt was made to replicate the psychological experience
of having one's interests indirectly presented, having a group voice during intra-group decision-making
appears to represent a distinct situation in which group members want direct input. This distinction in
situational context is theoretically important and warrants future work.
However, compared to Study 1's finding that having a personal voice increases one's expected
effort towards achieving group goals, Study 2 found that having personal voice (i.e., more procedural
justice) led to less actual effort put forth in achieving the group’s goal. This is in contrast to the
common finding that the more justice one experiences, the more positive group behaviors one exhibits
(e.g., Desai et al., 2011; Terwel et al., 2010; Tyler & Blader, 2003). To probe why this unexpected
result may be occurring, additional analyses were run.
Correlations and Mediation. To test Hypotheses 2, that certainty mediates the relationship
between the directness of one's voice and group behavior, correlational analyses were run among
participants' responses to the various questionnaire items and the experimental conditions. In Study 1,
only the Personal Voice and Group Voice conditions were selected in order to assess why there was a
difference in expected effort found between the two groups. In Study 2, the same difference was found
in participants' group behavior. Therefore, the remaining analyses will only include the Personal Voice
and Group Voice groups (Personal Voice = 1, Group Voice = 0).
40

Point-biserial correlations (see Table 4) found that having more direct voice was positively
related to the belief that one's views were considered (r = .79, p < .001), perceptions of fairness (r =
.70, p < .001), control (r = .68, p < .001), certainty about how many points each object use would be
worth (i.e., decision-certainty; r = .29, p < .01), and how many points one would earn by the end of the
day (outcome-certainty; r = .31, p < .01). Furthermore, more direct voice was negatively related to the
number of object uses generated, or one's effort towards the success of one's group (r = -.25, p < .05).
These findings are all consistent with the ANOVA results. Of particular interest are the factors that
were related to one's effort. The current results found that certainty about how many points each object
use would be worth was negatively related to effort (r = -.23, p < .05), suggesting certainty of the
decision may serve as mediator.
To explore the possible mediation of voice on effort by certainty of the decision outcome, a
simple mediation test (Hayes, 2012) was conducted with certainty as the only mediator, based on Desai
et al.'s (2011) findings. The unstandardized regression coefficients for the effects of voice on the
number of object uses generated was obtained, B = -4.90, t (97) = -2.49, p < .05, as well as for the
effects of voice on certainty, B = 1.07, t (97) = 2.98, p < .01, and for the effects of certainty on number
of object uses generated, B = -1.24, t (97) = -2.32, p < .05. Following the procedures put forth by Hayes
(2012), the bootstrapped test (10,000 samples) for the indirect effect of this mediation pattern revealed
that the estimate of the indirect effect (M = -1.00, SE = .68) was significantly different from zero (p <
.05, 95% confidence interval = -2.79, -.003; see Figure 2). With the mediator entered into the model,
the direct effect of voice on object uses became non-significant, B = -3.89, t = -1.91, p > .05,
suggesting full mediation. However, when both the voice predictor and the certainty mediator are
entered into the model, the certainty of how many points each use would be worth becomes a
marginally significant predictor, B = -.94, t (96) = -1.70, p = .09. Therefore, the significant mediation
must be interpreted with caution and the value of perceived decision-certainty as a mediator must be
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Table 4
Intercorrelations with Personal Voice and Group Voice Conditions: Study 2 (N = 99)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1. Voice Conditions
(PV = 1; GV = 0)
2. Allowed Voice

.90***

--

3. Views Considered

.79***

.84***

--

4. Averaged Fairness

.70***

.72***

.78***

5. Control

.68***

.73***

.85*** .76***

6. Certain Points Worth

.29**

.30**

.46*** .45*** .65***

--

7. Certain Points Earn

.31**

.33***

.42*** .46*** .59***

.72***

--

.11

.12

.20

.34***

.26**

.13

.22*

--

-.25*

-.26**

-.20

-.17

-.14

-.23*

-.15

.18

8. General Certainty
9. Object Uses

--

Note. *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001
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---

Certainty of Object
Use Worth
B = -1.24, -2.32*
(B = -.94, -1.70ns)

B = 1.07, 2.98**

Personal Voice = 1
Group Voice = 0

(B = -4.90, -2.49*)
B = -3.89, -1.91ns
M = -1.00, SE = .68
95% CI: -2.79, -.003

Figure 2. Study 2: Certainty Fully Mediates the Voice – Performance Relationship
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Object Uses
Generated

assessed by the overall role it plays in predicting how much effort would be put forth towards the
group’s goal.
Compared to experiencing group voice, having a more direct voice in the outcome of a decision
predicts more certainty over the outcome of the decision, which in turn predicts less effort to be put
forth in achieving those outcomes. This replicates the findings of Study 1 in that certainty mediates the
voice – group behavior relationship. In the current case however, this mediated relationship contradicts
the direction by which the mediation occurs. Rather than showing that more certainty leads to positive
group behaviors, the current study found that those who are more certain of their future put forth less
effort for one's group when given such an opportunity. It may be the case that for some people there is
still a positive relationship between level of certainty and group behavior. To assess this, participants’
level of risk aversion was also considered in this mediated relationship.
Moderated Mediation. To further probe the relationship between having voice and group
behavior, a moderated mediation analysis was run to examine whether the effect of certainty of the
decision outcome on the number of object uses generated depends on one's level of risk aversion
(Hypothesis 3; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). It is predicted that high risk-averse individuals
experiencing low certainty and low risk-averse individuals experiencing high certainty would generate
fewer object uses, while high risk-averse individuals experiencing high certainty and low risk-averse
individuals experiencing low certainty would generate more object uses. In other words, it was
predicted that low risk-averse people would respond negatively and have lower performance when
experiencing more voice than when experiencing less voice via the increase of certainty, whereas high
risk-averse people would respond positively and have higher performance when experiencing more
voice than when experiencing less voice via the increase of certainty.
To test this prediction, a moderated mediation analysis was run (Hayes, 2012; see Table 5). The
non-significant interaction between Risk Aversion and Certain Points Worth in the dependent variable
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Table 5
Regression Results for Moderated Mediation Analyses with Personal Voice and Group
Voice Conditions: Study 2 (N = 99)

Mediator Variable Model
Predictor
Constant

B
1.19

SE
.57

t
2.11

p
.037

Voice (PV = 1, GV = 0)

1.07

.36

2.98

.004

Dependent Variable Model
Predictor
Constant

B
30.69

SE
12.37

t
2.48

p
.015

Voice

-3.85

2.08

-1.86

.067

Certain Points Worth

-1.52

3.35

-.45

.652

Risk Aversion

-.14

3.16

-.04

.964

Risk Aversion x Certain Points Worth

.15

.89

.17

.862

Conditional Effects at Risk Aversion = mean and
+/- 1 SD
Risk Aversion (W)

Boot SE

-1 SD Risk Aversion (2.94)

Boot
indirect
effect
-1.13

.92

-3.440

.308

Mean Risk Aversion (3.57)

-1.03

.69

-2.784

.024

+1 SD Risk Aversion (4.21)

-.92

.93

-3.099

.626

45

Bootstrap 95% CI
(5000; Lower,Upper)

model however implied that the indirect effect of voice on group behavior through certainty was not
moderated by one's level of risk aversion. The lack of a moderated indirect effect was further evidenced
by evaluating the bootstrapped indirect effects at multiple values of Risk Aversion. Specifically, results
showed that all conditional indirect effects were not significant for those falling at the mean +/- 1 SD of
Risk Aversion: -1 SD Risk Aversion = 2.94, Bootstrapped Indirect Effect = -1.13, Bootstrapped 95%
CI: -3.440, .308; Mean Risk Aversion = 3.57, Bootstrapped Indirect Effect = -1.03, Bootstrapped 95%
CI: -2.784, .024; + 1 SD Risk Aversion = 4.21, Bootstrapped Indirect Effect = -.92, Bootstrapped 95%
CI: -3.099, .626.
General Discussion
The purpose of the current investigations was to examine the effects of procedural justice,
particularly the amount of voice one is given during decision-making, on positive group behaviors. In
particular, across two studies, participants were made to believe they belonged to a group that needed
to make a decision. In these situations, participants were provided varying degrees of voice during the
decision-making process to see what effect this had on their perceptions of and beliefs regarding the
situation and decision-making process, judgments of members of the group, and expectations of the
consequences of the decision being made. The results of both studies reveal a fairly consistent picture
of how varying degrees of voice can affect members of groups.
The purpose of Study 1 was to be an initial test of the relative effects various forms of voice
during group decision-making have on group members' perceptions and predicted behaviors.
Specifically, participants were asked to imagine themselves as belonging to a software company that
was questioning whether to take a new computer game into production. As a member of one of two
work groups of different sizes (i.e., 2 people versus 20 people) within the larger software company,
participants were given one of four scenarios depicting the boss of the company requesting the opinions
of the employees. The boss either requested that members of the group provide their opinion directly to
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the boss (Personal Voice), every member of the group provide their opinion to a group representative
who then provides an opinion to the boss (Composite Voice), a single group representative provides an
opinion to the boss on behalf of the entire group with no group member input (Group Voice), or no
group members were allowed to voice their opinions and the boss would decide alone (No Voice).
The results of Study 1 found that having a personal, direct voice, whether it directed at the
authority or one's representative, is related to increased perceptions of control, trust, and certainty and
is related to more predicted effort put forth for the group. In contrast, having either only an indirect
voice or no voice at all was shown to be related to low levels of control, trust, and certainty.
Furthermore, simply having an indirect voice was related to less predicted effort given toward
achieving group goals. The findings of Study 1 suggest that the reason more voice is related to more
positive group effort is because of how trust in the decision-maker is positively related to being more
certain of what that decision-maker will do, which in turn predicts more certainty of how the decision
will affect one’s self as a member of the group in the future. Therefore, Study 1 supports the notion that
the psychological experiences of group voice and personal voice are quite divergent.
The purpose of Study 2 was to bring the current research questions into the lab and see whether
similar results could be found when participants belonged to a real group. Participants joined four other
group members with the task of generating uses for an everyday object so the group could earn points
for chances in a lottery. How many points each object use was worth, though, was dependent on how
the researcher chose to negotiate (i.e., provide an opportunity for voice) with the group. Depending on
condition, participants believed every member of the group would provide a counter-offer to the
researcher's initial offer (Personal Voice), a randomly chosen group representative would provide a
counter-offer on behalf of the rest of the group without any input from the other group members
(Group Voice), or the group was not allowed to negotiate (No Voice).
The results of Study 2 are similar to those of Study 1, in that more direct voice was related to
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increased perceptions of voice and certainty. Trust in the decision-maker was not measured in Study 2
because it was unclear whether there was a single, distinct decision-maker. In the cover story for Study
2, participants believed that after negotiations, the group would ultimately be provided two offers from
two fictional companies that wanted the group to create object uses at a particular rate. In this sense,
participants were led to believe that the group itself would have the final say as to whom they would
work for and for how many points. Compared to the scenario in Study 1, where the boss clearly
represented the decision-maker, the paradigm used in Study 2 was not conducive for establishing a
single authority that needed to be trusted. It could be argued that the researcher, who was or was not
going to use the group's voice(s), could be a worthy target for group members' trust. However, it was
believed to be an unrealistic situation in which the authority could not be trusted. In other words,
having participants evaluate a researcher seemed likely to only show ceiling effects in perceptions of
trust. Obviously this may not be the case and future work would do well to measure group members'
trust in the researcher, believing that just as found in Study 1, trust would be higher when provided a
personal voice compared to a group voice or no voice.
Voice’s Different Effect on Behavior
An unexpected finding in Study 2 was that more voice given to group members was related to
fewer object uses generated on behalf of the group. Inconsistent with the conclusions drawn from Study
1, participants in Study 2 put forth less effort on the task at hand after having been given a direct say as
to how the task should benefit the group. In a task that measures the motivation of individual members
to benefit the group as a whole, having a personal voice appears to lessen this motivation so that
members appear to be less cooperative than when members are merely provided a group voice. Allison,
Messick, and Samuelson (1985) found similar results in their field study of public-good contributions.
Allison et al. contacted the alumni of a graduate psychology program saying that the quality of
graduate student research (i.e., the public good) was in jeopardy because of budgetary cutbacks. The
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alumni were asked for monetary donations to help sustain the high quality of the public good. The
independent variable was whether the alumni were simply asked to donate money or whether they were
asked for money and their opinions were solicited regarding how the department should use the money
that is collected. The later condition represented an opportunity for the alumni to provide a voice, with
Allison et al. predicting that those alumni that had their opinions solicited would contribute more.
Despite the fact that there were no differences in the overall number of alumni that chose to
contribute money between those who had their opinions solicited or not, it was found that those who
were given a questionnaire about their opinions contributed significantly less than those who did not
have their opinions asked. Allison et al.'s (1985) post hoc explanation for this unexpected result
suggests that the level of contribution represents a form of helping response and that the alumni were
induced to weigh the costs and benefits of making that helping response. The authors discuss that the
alumni's “cost” of filling out the questionnaire (i.e., effort exerted; time lost) may have affected the
alumni's contribution behavior. As Allison et al. (1985) put it: “returning the questionnaire may have
been counted as a contribution to the department that had some significant cash equivalence” (p. 204).
In this sense, those who are given a voice during decision making may “overestimate the impact of
their actions” (p. 205); similar results have been found related to an egocentric bias regarding
attributions of responsibility for the outcome of a joint product (Ross & Sicoly, 1979). Although this
explanation is speculative, the current results show the same pattern of results. Participants in the
Group Voice and No Voice conditions did not technically provide a voice and thus may not have
provided a significant contribution to attaining the goal of a final decision. This explanation for Study
2's findings remains consistent with the findings of Study 1 because in Study 1 participants were
merely asked to report their level of expected effort. Having a direct voice may positively affect group
members' expectations while adversely affecting actual group behavior through a diffusion of
responsibility for the final group outcome. This possibility undoubtedly depends on various factors,
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such as commitment to one's group and the perceived efficacy of one's voice in the final decisionoutcome.
To say that group members who experienced personal voice are unmotivated may be unfair.
The truth may be that being given a personal voice changes one’s motivation to be more ego-centric
and away from an orientation to help the group. Rather than being unmotivated because of diffusion of
responsibility, group members that provide a personal voice may be actively trying to avoid being the
“sucker” of the group and being taken advantage of by the other members. This suggests that if all
members are trying to avoid being the sucker, then the group's overall output would be less than it
would be if all were putting forth full effort. Those given a personal voice may believe that the
outcome of the decision will be optimal: the highest number of points per object use, relative to the
initial offer, that this group could negotiate. This means the final decision would likely result in the
highest amount of points earned. This belief may make those who provided a personal voice realize
that the other members of the group want to receive these points without having to earn them.
Therefore, having a personal voice may make group members self-protective and defensive.
Another possible outcome of holding a belief that personal voice means the final decision will be ideal
is that it makes the situation quite lucrative for one's self and thus a perfect opportunity to loaf. Being
given opportunities for voice have been shown to raise recipients' outcome expectancies (Houlden,
Walker, & Thibaut, 1978; Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990). Rather than making oneself overly defensive,
having a personal voice may actively promote more selfish patterns of behavior. Consequently, if not
provided a voice or merely provided group voice, then one must put in significantly more effort to
compensate for the less-than-ideal decision made. The results of Study 2 support these potential lines of
thinking, with those in the Group Voice condition putting forth the most effort, perhaps because having
a single representative provide a voice leaves open the possibility that the representative’s voice was
used inappropriately and did not mirror how one's own voice would have and should have been used.
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On the other hand, another possible explanation for Study 2’s findings may be that when given
a personal voice one believes that the outcome of the decision will be sub-optimal or averaged across
the many voices; giving all group members a voice may force the decision-maker to settle to
accommodate everyone’s opinion. Therefore, group members may feel that some internal goal of
earning a particular number of lottery chances may be more difficult to achieve because of the lessthan-ideal compromise that had to be made. In this sense, those given a personal voice may not feel
their efforts are worth it and are content in working less. Consequently, this would suggest that those
provided group voice expect the final decision to be optimal and worth the time and effort needed to
successfully complete the task. Zaccaro (1984) found that social loafing decreases under conditions of
high task attractiveness, with task attractiveness manipulated by having participants believe the highest
scoring group in the social loafing task would receive extra experimental credits (high attractiveness) or
not including any information about extra experimental credits (low attractiveness).
It has been argued that commitment to the group and/or commitment to the successful
completion of social loafing tasks are factors that exert a force on group members to reduce loafing and
promote positive group behaviors (Festinger, 1950). To ensure commitment, groups can increase how
much group output is worth for each individual member. In other words, a task may be said to be
attractive and worth doing if the outcomes of the task are substantial and profitable for the group's
members. The question remains as to whether having group voice fulfills these criteria? This is
unlikely, given the similarity in the number of generated object uses between the Group Voice and No
Voice conditions. The only information provided to participants in the No Voice condition was that the
company representative's offer was extremely low (5 points with a 25% chance) compared to the
historical information provided (40 points with a 50% chance). It is unlikely that the No Voice groups
felt this was optimal. Future work would do well to question group members' beliefs about the expected
outcome of the decision and whether these beliefs about how many points each object use would be
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worth reflects whether one was given a direct voice or an indirect voice.
Why Voice Affects Behavior
In both studies, mediational analyses found that participants' perceptions of certainty help
explain why experiencing voice predicts future behavior. In Study 1, having more direct voice
predicted more trust in the boss to make the correct decision, which in turn predicted more certainty of
the outcome of the decision. Certainty of what the decision would be predicted more certainty that the
consequences of the decision would be a success, which ultimately predicted more projected effort
given toward accomplishing group goals. The findings of Study 2 found that having more direct voice
predicted more certainty of the outcome of the decision, which in turn predicted fewer object uses
generated. The reason why perceptions of certainty played such an important role in determining group
members' behavior may be because group members, in both studies, had to make judgments about the
decision without having any information about the outcome of the decision. Group members had to rely
on internal judgments and perceptions to guide their behavior because the external situation lacked
evidence that could help inform their decisions to behave a particular way. The hypothetical nature of
Study 1 required that participants project how much effort they would be willing to put forth towards
the company's goal, with no real decision ever being made. In Study 2, participants had been told time
was running short and that it would be best if the group would complete the object-use task prior to
learning how many points each object use would be worth. In both cases, judging the quality of the
decision-making process (e.g., what does having group voice mean for the success of me and my
group?) could not rely on the outcome of the decision.
Baron and Hershey (1988) investigated outcome biases when evaluating decisions. Evaluations
are often made after the fact, which suggests that knowing the outcome of a decision may bias one's
evaluations of the quality of the decision. It may be difficult to differentiate between a good decision
and a good outcome if both forms of information are known. Knowledge gained after a decision is
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made should be “irrelevant to the quality of the decision” (Baron & Hershey, 1988, p. 569). Therefore,
group members who are provided with a particular amount of voice during group decision-making and
are subsequently asked to behave prior to knowing the decision outcome may not succumb to this
outcome bias. Baron and Hershey's had participants read about various decisions having to be made
and the outcomes of those decisions. For example, one scenario depicted a 55-year-old man, with a
heart condition having to stop work and quit recreational activities. Participants further read that a
bypass operation could help his pain but that the operation had a high success rate. Finally, the
participants were told that the man's physician decided to do the operation and it was a success. After
reading a scenario such as the one depicted above, participants were asked to evaluate the physician's
decision to do the operation. Variations of the scenarios reflected different decisions having to be made
and different outcomes (e.g., the operation failed and the man died). The results generally found that
participants rated the decision-making thinking as better, judged the decision maker as more
competent, and were more willing to yield to the decision when the outcome was favorable compared
to unfavorable. A reason why outcome information biases one's evaluations of a decision is that beliefs
about the probability of an outcome are modified after gaining outcome information. Knowing that an
outcome occurred makes you believe that outcome was more probable, or more certain to have
occurred (hindsight bias).
The participants in Study 1 and Study 2 did not have decision-outcome information, so they
could not use this information to judge the quality of the voice procedure. However, being able to
directly express an opinion about whether a game should go into production or about how many points
each object use should be worth may make one believe there is outcome information. In one sense, by
providing a direct voice, group members are creating their own outcome information (similar to the
notion of voice providing “outcome control”; Shapiro & Brett, 2005), despite the real possibility it is
false outcome information. Although this explanation is speculative, Baron and Hershey (1988) may
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then argue that the current participants could still succumb to the outcome bias and evaluate the quality
of the decision and decision-making process, subsequently guiding decisions to behave a particular way
towards the group, by reflecting on self-generated outcome information. This self-generated
information may further modify the judged probability of an outcome, helping to explain why
perceived certainty (increased probability of an outcome) results from experiencing more direct forms
of voice and why this certainty helped predict future behavior. Across both studies, it appeared that the
judged probability of the decision outcome increased with more voices involved (Desai et al., 2011;
Lind, 2001; Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002).
Group Voice versus No Voice
Finally, the current studies suggest that the experience of group voice may be similar to that of
not having a voice at all, evidenced by the consistent lack of differences between those in the Group
Voice and No Voice conditions across both studies. The lack of differences is in contrast to Terwel et
al.'s (2010) findings that the experience of group voice is distinct from not having a voice when
evaluating one's level of trust of the decision makers (group voice leading to more trust) and when
deciding whether to accept the final decision made (i.e., cooperation; group voice leading to more
acceptance/cooperation).
This inconsistency may be explained by Terwel et al.'s (2010) operationalization of group voice
as when an interest group (i.e., an association of like-minded people that publicly promotes and creates
advantages for its cause) receives an opportunity to voice group members' opinions during decisionmaking. In their studies, Terwel et al.'s participants were induced to be pro carbon-dioxide capture and
storage (CCS; i.e., on the side of a pro-CCS, environmental non-governmental organization), and were
led to believe that pro- or con-CCS interest groups were either allowed or denied the ability to advise a
national government “CCS board.” The presence or absence of participants' group voice came in the
form of whether or not the pro-CCS interest group was allowed to advise the government on behalf of
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the participants’ now held beliefs. The difference between the current findings and Terwel et al.'s may
be due to the fact that the current participants believed they would have a single representative express
their opinions rather than having an entire interest group, of multiple voices, being represented. It may
be easier to trust the efforts of a group of representatives rather than the efforts of a single person.
Therefore, the current investigation's operationalization of group voice may naturally lead to lowered
levels of trust compared to other forms group voice can take. The possibility that the number of voices
representing one's voice can serve as a moderator of the psychological effects of group voice has great
potential for future investigations.
Future Directions
Based on the analysis of the two studies above, there are many possibilities for future avenues
of research. First, replications of the current studies would benefit from asking group members
precisely of what they feel certain. The results of both Study 1 and 2 suggest that the reason why
having voice during decision making affects group behavior is because voice affects perceptions of
certainty. However, participants in the current studies were asked to respond to items assessing
certainty targeted at the situation (e.g., “I am certain how many points each generated object use is
worth”). Responses to this item, for example, cannot tell us precisely how many points they believed
each use would be worth. Participants who experienced high amounts of certainty in Study 2 may have
been certain that each use would be worth 80 points, either making one's individual contributions more
lucrative or representing a perfect situation in which to slack off and loaf. It may also be the case that
participants were very certain that each use would only be worth 8 points, either making one's
contributions that more crucial to help the group succeed or representing a situation that behaving is not
worth the effort. To begin to understand how high levels of certainty can in one instance predict more
effort while in another instance predict less effort, it will be important to further probe group members
as to whether they are certain that the decision will result in positive outcomes for oneself and/or the
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group or will be detrimental to oneself/the group (e.g., “How many points do you think each object use
will ultimately be worth?”; “Do you believe this point value will be beneficial for you/for the group?”).
Responses to these items can help us gain insight into group members' motivational state, which may
further help predict in what direction behavior will occur.
The fact that group members across both studies may have been in differing motivational states,
despite explicitly expressing a state of certainty/uncertainty, suggests that another avenue of future
research may focus on varying the type of task in which various forms of voice may be given. In Study
1, participants took on the role of a group member in a larger company, with participants believing they
had at least one boss. The task in Study 2 was purposefully chosen to be a social loafing task, in which
individual input could not be traced back to a single group member. Therefore, Study 1 may have
represented a scenario that lacked anonymity (however this is speculation given the scenario-based
nature of the task), while Study 2 represented a high-anonymity task.
Desai et al.'s (2011) Study 3 had participants complete mazes for one of two imagined
companies. Similar to the current Study 2, Desai et al. had participants use a keyboard to move a blue
dot through a maze to reach an end-point, and for each maze completed, an individual would earn
points based on how he/she had been allowed to negotiate with one of the company's representative.
Desai et al. found that having personal voice predicted higher perceptions of certainty, which in turn
predicted more mazes completed. This contradicts the current Study 2's findings. However, Desai et al.
measured participants individually, not as members of a group. It is very likely that Desai et al.'s
participants did not feel anonymous completing their task on a computer, where the researcher was
tracking individual performance. Having a more direct voice negatively predicted performance in the
high-anonymity, social-loafing task in Study 2, suggesting that having a more direct voice may make
one certain that each object use will be worth enough points to legitimately free-ride on the effort of
others while still gaining rewards (a possibility discussed above). Future work could focus on using
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non-social loafing group tasks to see if the pattern of results reflect those found in Study 1 and Desai et
al. (2011), where having a more direct voice and more certainty both positively predicted behavior.
Another interesting future question deals with the level of analysis in which group voice is
experienced. As discussed previously, the current form of group voice most readily represents
intragroup voice, where a single representative is speaking on behalf of other members of the same
group. Terwel et al.’s (2010) intergroup voice occurs when two (or more) groups each send a
representative to express differing opinions. It is clear that future work on group voice should focus on
clarifying why under particular conditions having one’s voice indirectly expressed either positively or
negatively affects group members. Particularly at the intergroup level, the positive effects of group
voice may be contingent on other psychological processes, such as ingroup favoritism (i.e., the ingroup
bias effect; Brewer, 2007; Hewstone et al., 2002; Scheepers et al., 2006) or high levels of intergroup
competition and low levels of trust in the outgroup (i.e., the individual-group discontinuity effect; Insko
et al., 1998; Insko, Schopler, Gaertner, et al., 2001; Lodewijkx, Rabbie, & Visser, 2006; Schopler et al.,
1994). Under such circumstances, having an indirect voice is at least better than not having a voice at
all, just as long as the outgroup cannot have an abundance of unchecked influence; group voice is better
than their voice.
During intragroup voice, however, another factor that future work can focus on may be how the
representative for the group is chosen. In Study 1, the participants read that the boss chose the
representative, and in Study 2 it was made clear the representative was to be chosen at random.
Whether one identifies with the representative as a fellow group member (i.e., social identity theory;
Tajfel & Turner, 1979) may affect the level of trust in the representative to truly speak on behalf of the
entire group, including oneself. If group members are given the opportunity to choose their
representative voice (e.g., by unanimous vote or simple majority) then the representative may be
perceived to be more reliable and trustworthy, thus potentially increasing the scope of situations in
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which intragroup voice can positively affect individual group members’ motivations and behaviors.
This may explain why Terwel et al. (2010) found a positive relationship between being provided group
voice and trust, because the participants and the interest groups were explicitly made to believe they
share the same values and goals and are consequently alike within the same social category.
Finally, a future extension of the current studies would be to examine whether group members'
social value orientations help predict the desire for personal voice or group voice. Social value
orientation (SVO) is an individual difference variable that differentiates between egocentric and
egalitarian motives during group decision-making (e.g., Messick & McClintock, 1968). Individuals that
hold egocentric and egalitarian perspectives are common labeled as proselfs and prosocials,
respectively. Regarding the distinction between personal voice and group voice, proselfs and prosocials
appear to desire different distributions of voice among group members. Van Prooijen et al. (2008)
found that proselfs are consistently “responsive to variations in the extent to which decision-making
authorities allow or deny them the opportunity to voice their opinions” (Van Prooijen, Ståhl, Eek, &
Van Lange, 2012, p. 1248). Van Prooijen et al. (2012) show that when someone else receives a voice,
one's own procedure is viewed more favorably after receiving a voice compared to when denied a
voice. However, SVO did not appear to matter following an own no-voice procedure when another
received voice. When the self is denied an opportunity to have a voice, and someone else is given that
opportunity instead, perceptions of the fairness are expected to be low. This replicates the findings of
the current studies, with participants from both studies in the Group Voice conditions believing such a
system with some random person being given a voice, ostensibly as a representative voice for the
group, to be unfair.
What is interesting in Van Prooijen et al.'s (2012) findings is that when another person is denied
a voice, SVO appeared to affect perceptions of one's own procedure. Van Prooijen et al.'s results found
that the procedural evaluations of proselfs were strongly based on whether they themselves received a
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voice. Proselfs perceived procedures to be fair only if they received voice, regardless of whether
anyone else received voice. Prosocials were concerned about whether there was an equality of voice
between people, whether this means both received a voice or both were denied a voice. With this in
mind, it may be the case that SVO differentially matters in procedural judgments depending on the
form group voice takes. If during intergroup decision-making both groups' members experience group
voice (i.e., both groups send a representative voice), then both proselfs and prosocials may be happy
and experience fairness either because the self receives a voice or because there is an equality of voice
among groups. Although not measured, this may account for the increased perceptions of fairness with
Terwel et al.'s (2010) intergroup voice. Unfortunately, during intragroup voice, the fact that a
representative's voice is the only voice being heard is quite salient in the mind of group members, thus
predicting that perceptions of group voice to be universally unfair for all SVO types (either because the
self is denied a voice or because there is an inequality of voices within the group). Taken together,
these findings suggest measuring group member's SVOs may help further the literature on group voice
by differentiating when and why people may believe it is acceptable to experience group voice.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the findings of the current research suggest that groups must take care to ensure
their members are treated in a fair manner because there are both benefits and limitations to providing
members a voice during decision-making. Particularly relevant for a wide variety of real-world groups,
the results of the above studies suggest that it would be wrong to rely solely on group voice to instill a
sense of procedural justice in the minds of the members of the groups. However, the need for group
voice is quite common in an ever-more-complex society. For example, there can be various
opportunities for voices to be heard within a large corporation, such as having a small group of
employees airing grievances to a manager or a union representative sitting in on negotiations for
employee benefits. Any form of hierarchy is inherently based on the notion of providing group voice,
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with one’s personal voice being sent continually up the line in an ever more indirect fashion.
Unfortunately, the current research argues that such a group structure may provide efficiency at
the cost of individual member satisfaction. Interestingly, there are other cases of group voice that occur
in the real world where group members have historically been satisfied with having one’s interests
represented with no day-to-day, direct input to the point that large amounts of personal time and money
are given to ensure this indirect voice can be heard (e.g., Congress). However, as Terwel et al. (2010)
found, the positive effects that come from this form of group voice may rest on the fact that it is
intergroup voice, where one’s indirect voice is at least better than another’s voice alone. Taking Terwel
et al.’s findings and the current findings together, the endeavor to understand group voice will be
complex and beneficial. The future of research on the effects of group voice is full of possibilities and
will be conducive to interdisciplinary investigations that are relevant not only to the psychological
literature but also to the understanding of society’s fundamental notions of what is considered
democratic, just, and fair.
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Appendix A: Study 1 Informed Consent Form
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
Title: Evaluating Employee Decision-Making
Investigator(s):
David A. Schroeder, Ph.D
Dennis L. Poepsel, M.S.
University of Arkansas
College of Arts and Sciences
Department of Psychology
216 Memorial Hall
Fayetteville, AR 72703
479-575-4256
Administrator:
Ro Windwalker, Compliance Coordinator
Research & Sponsored Programs
Research Compliance
University of Arkansas
210 Administration
Fayetteville, AR 72701-1201
479-575-2208
irb@uark.edu
Restrictions: You must be at least 18 years old to participate in this experiment.
Description: As a participant, you will be presented with a scenario asking you to take on the role of an employee of a
company and you will be asked to answer a series of questions based on the situation depicted in the scenario. This study
will take 30 minutes.
Confidentiality: The responses you provide on materials associated with this experiment will be recorded anonymously,
separate from this consent form, and kept confidential to the extent allowed by law and University policy. Your name will
never be used in reporting the results of our research.
Risks and Benefits: There are no risks to participating in the study. By participating in this study, the researchers will have
a clearer picture as to how group members desire interactions to occur within a group. Participants will also gain insights
into how psychological research is actually conducted. Participants will receive research participation credit for this study
(1/2 research credit).
Voluntary Participation: Your participation in the research is completely voluntary. You are free to discontinue your
participation in this study at any time. You do not need to answer any question that you do not want to answer. You may
receive credit toward your General Psychology research requirement for participation. If you discontinue participation, you
will still receive credit commensurate with the time you have spent.
Informed Consent: I have read the description, including the nature and purpose of the study, the procedures to be used,
the potential risks and benefits, as well as the option to discontinue my participation in the study at any time. I believe that I
understand what I will be doing. By typing my name below, I indicate that I am over 18 years of age and freely agree to
participate in this experimental study.
____________________________________
Signature
____________________________________
Date
____________________________________
STUDENT ID#
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Appendix B: Study 1 Scenarios and Questions
*2 Person Group/Personal Voice
Read this scenario as if you are experiencing the situation yourself.
You are an employee at a company producing and selling computer games and software. In this company, employees work
together in teams. Your team consists of you and one other employee. A decision has to be made whether or not to take a
new computer game into production. Doing so is risky because if the game is a success, employees will get a large bonus,
but if the game is a failure, there will be firings. The company’s boss asks for your opinion and your fellow employee’s
opinion in order to use them during the decision-making process.
I am allowed to voice my opinion?
1
2
Not at All
I have control over this situation.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Very Much
So

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

6

7
Strongly
Agree

6

7
Strongly
Agree

I see no reason to doubt my boss’ competence to make the right decision?
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly
Disagree
I can rely on my boss not to make the wrong decision?
1
2
3
4
Strongly
Disagree

5

I feel certain about the final outcome of the decision to put the game into production?
1
2
3
4
5
6
Not at All

I expect the following to occur in the future.
-7
-6 -5 -4
-3 -2 -1
I will be
fired

0
Unsure
about
what will
happen

+1

I will work hard on producing the new computer game.
1
2
3
4
Strongly
Disagree
I will most likely quit this job.
1
2
Not at All

3

4

+2

+3

+4

+5

7
Very Much
So

+6

+7
I will receive
the large bonus

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

5

6

7
Definitely

How many people were either directly or indirectly allowed to express an opinion during the decision-making process?
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*20 Person Group/Personal Voice
Read this scenario as if you are experiencing the situation yourself.
You are an employee at a company producing and selling computer games and software. In this company, employees work
together in teams. Your team consists of you and nineteen other employees. A decision has to be made whether or not to
take a new computer game into production. Doing so is risky because if the game is a success, employees will get a large
bonus, but if the game is a failure, there will be firings. The company’s boss asks for your opinion and all of your fellow
employees’ opinions in order to use them during the decision-making process.
I am allowed to voice my opinion?
1
2
Not at All

I have control over this situation.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Very Much
So

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

6

7
Strongly
Agree

6

7
Strongly
Agree

I see no reason to doubt my boss’ competence to make the right decision?
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly
Disagree
I can rely on my boss not to make the wrong decision?
1
2
3
4
Strongly
Disagree

5

I feel certain about the final outcome of the decision to put the game into production?
1
2
3
4
5
6
Not at All

I expect the following to occur in the future.
-7
-6 -5 -4
-3 -2 -1
I will be
fired

0
Unsure
about
what will
happen

+1

I will work hard on producing the new computer game.
1
2
3
4
Strongly
Disagree
I will most likely quit this job.
1
2
Not at All

3

4

+2

+3

+4

+5

7
Very Much
So

+6

+7
I will receive
the large bonus

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

5

6

7
Definitely

How many people were either directly or indirectly allowed to express an opinion during the decision-making process?
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*2 Person Group/Group Voice
Read this scenario as if you are experiencing the situation yourself.
You are an employee at a company producing and selling computer games and software. In this company, employees work
together in teams. Your team consists of you and one other employee. A decision has to be made whether or not to take a
new computer game into production. Doing so is risky because if the game is a success, employees will get a large bonus,
but if the game is a failure, there will be firings. The company’s boss asks for your fellow employee’s opinion, to serve as a
representative of the opinions of your entire team, in order to use it during the decision-making process. You do not have a
chance to discuss your opinion with your team’s representative before he talks to the boss.
I am allowed to voice my opinion?
1
2
Not at All

I have control over this situation.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Very Much
So

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

6

7
Strongly
Agree

6

7
Strongly
Agree

I see no reason to doubt my boss’ competence to make the right decision?
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly
Disagree
I can rely on my boss not to make the wrong decision?
1
2
3
4
Strongly
Disagree

5

I feel certain about the final outcome of the decision to put the game into production?
1
2
3
4
5
6
Not at All

I expect the following to occur in the future.
-7
-6 -5 -4
-3 -2 -1
I will be
fired

0
Unsure
about
what will
happen

+1

I will work hard on producing the new computer game.
1
2
3
4
Strongly
Disagree
I will most likely quit this job.
1
2
Not at All

3

4

+2

+3

+4

+5

7
Very Much
So

+6

+7
I will receive
the large bonus

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

5

6

7
Definitely

How many people were either directly or indirectly allowed to express an opinion during the decision-making process?
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*20 Person Group/Group Voice
Read this scenario as if you are experiencing the situation yourself.
You are an employee at a company producing and selling computer games and software. In this company, employees work
together in teams. Your team consists of you and nineteen other employees. A decision has to be made whether or not to
take a new computer game into production. Doing so is risky because if the game is a success, employees will get a large
bonus, but if the game is a failure, there will be firings. The company’s boss asks one of your fellow employee’s opinion, to
serve as a representative of the opinions of your entire team, in order to use it during the decision-making process. You and
the other team members do not have a chance to discuss your opinions with your team’s representative before he talks to the
boss.
I am allowed to voice my opinion?
1
2
Not at All

I have control over this situation.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Very Much
So

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

6

7
Strongly
Agree

6

7
Strongly
Agree

I see no reason to doubt my boss’ competence to make the right decision?
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly
Disagree
I can rely on my boss not to make the wrong decision?
1
2
3
4
Strongly
Disagree

5

I feel certain about the final outcome of the decision to put the game into production?
1
2
3
4
5
6
Not at All

I expect the following to occur in the future.
-7
-6 -5 -4
-3 -2 -1
I will be
fired

0
Unsure
about
what will
happen

+1

I will work hard on producing the new computer game.
1
2
3
4
Strongly
Disagree
I will most likely quit this job.
1
2
Not at All

3

4

+2

+3

+4

+5

7
Very Much
So

+6

+7
I will receive
the large bonus

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

5

6

7
Definitely

How many people were either directly or indirectly allowed to express an opinion during the decision-making process?
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*2 Person Group/Composite Voice
Read this scenario as if you are experiencing the situation yourself.
You are an employee at a company producing and selling computer games and software. In this company, employees work
together in teams. Your team consists of you and one other employee. A decision has to be made whether or not to take a
new computer game into production. Doing so is risky because if the game is a success, employees will get a large bonus,
but if the game is a failure, there will be firings. The company’s boss asks your fellow employee’s opinion, to serve as a
representative of the opinions of your entire team, in order to use it during the decision-making process. You discuss your
opinions with your team’s representative before he talks to the boss.
I am allowed to voice my opinion?
1
2
Not at All

I have control over this situation.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Very Much
So

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

6

7
Strongly
Agree

6

7
Strongly
Agree

I see no reason to doubt my boss’ competence to make the right decision?
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly
Disagree
I can rely on my boss not to make the wrong decision?
1
2
3
4
Strongly
Disagree

5

I feel certain about the final outcome of the decision to put the game into production?
1
2
3
4
5
6
Not at All

I expect the following to occur in the future.
-7
-6 -5 -4
-3 -2 -1
I will be
fired

0
Unsure
about
what will
happen

+1

I will work hard on producing the new computer game.
1
2
3
4
Strongly
Disagree
I will most likely quit this job.
1
2
Not at All

3

4

+2

+3

+4

+5

7
Very Much
So

+6

+7
I will receive
the large bonus

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

5

6

7
Definitely

How many people were either directly or indirectly allowed to express an opinion during the decision-making process?
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*20 Person Group/Composite Voice
Read this scenario as if you are experiencing the situation yourself.
You are an employee at a company producing and selling computer games and software. In this company, employees work
together in teams. Your team consists of you and nineteen other employees. A decision has to be made whether or not to
take a new computer game into production. Doing so is risky because if the game is a success, employees will get a large
bonus, but if the game is a failure, there will be firings. The company’s boss asks one of your fellow employee’s opinion, to
serve as a representative of the opinions of your entire team, in order to use it during the decision-making process. You and
the other team members discuss your opinions with your team’s representative before he talks to the boss.
I am allowed to voice my opinion?
1
2
Not at All

I have control over this situation.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Very Much
So

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

6

7
Strongly
Agree

6

7
Strongly
Agree

I see no reason to doubt my boss’ competence to make the right decision?
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly
Disagree
I can rely on my boss not to make the wrong decision?
1
2
3
4
Strongly
Disagree

5

I feel certain about the final outcome of the decision to put the game into production?
1
2
3
4
5
6
Not at All

I expect the following to occur in the future.
-7
-6 -5 -4
-3 -2 -1
I will be
fired

0
Unsure
about
what will
happen

+1

I will work hard on producing the new computer game.
1
2
3
4
Strongly
Disagree
I will most likely quit this job.
1
2
Not at All

3

4

+2

+3

+4

+5

7
Very Much
So

+6

+7
I will receive
the large bonus

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

5

6

7
Definitely

How many people were either directly or indirectly allowed to express an opinion during the decision-making process?
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*2 Person Group/No Voice
Read this scenario as if you are experiencing the situation yourself.
You are an employee at a company producing and selling computer games and software. In this company, employees work
together in teams. Your team consists of you and one other employee. A decision has to be made whether or not to take a
new computer game into production. Doing so is risky because if the game is a success, employees will get a large bonus,
but if the game is a failure, there will be firings. The company’s boss does not ask for your opinion or your fellow
employee’s opinion during the decision-making process; the boss makes the decision alone.
I am allowed to voice my opinion?
1
2
Not at All

I have control over this situation.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Very Much
So

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

6

7
Strongly
Agree

6

7
Strongly
Agree

I see no reason to doubt my boss’ competence to make the right decision?
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly
Disagree
I can rely on my boss not to make the wrong decision?
1
2
3
4
Strongly
Disagree

5

I feel certain about the final outcome of the decision to put the game into production?
1
2
3
4
5
6
Not at All

I expect the following to occur in the future.
-7
-6 -5 -4
-3 -2 -1
I will be
fired

0
Unsure
about
what will
happen

+1

I will work hard on producing the new computer game.
1
2
3
4
Strongly
Disagree
I will most likely quit this job.
1
2
Not at All

3

4

+2

+3

+4

+5

7
Very Much
So

+6

+7
I will receive
the large bonus

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

5

6

7
Definitely

How many people were either directly or indirectly allowed to express an opinion during the decision-making process?
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*20 Person Group/No Voice
Read this scenario as if you are experiencing the situation yourself.
You are an employee at a company producing and selling computer games and software. In this company, employees work
together in teams. Your team consists of you and nineteen other employees. A decision has to be made whether or not to
take a new computer game into production. Doing so is risky because if the game is a success, employees will get a large
bonus, but if the game is a failure, there will be firings. The company’s boss does not ask for your opinion or all of your
fellow employees’ opinions during the decision-making process; the boss makes the decision alone.
I am allowed to voice my opinion?
1
2
Not at All

I have control over this situation.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Very Much
So

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

6

7
Strongly
Agree

6

7
Strongly
Agree

I see no reason to doubt my boss’ competence to make the right decision?
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly
Disagree
I can rely on my boss not to make the wrong decision?
1
2
3
4
Strongly
Disagree

5

I feel certain about the final outcome of the decision to put the game into production?
1
2
3
4
5
6
Not at All

I expect the following to occur in the future.
-7
-6 -5 -4
-3 -2 -1
I will be
fired

0
Unsure
about
what will
happen

+1

I will work hard on producing the new computer game.
1
2
3
4
Strongly
Disagree
I will most likely quit this job.
1
2
Not at All

3

4

+2

+3

+4

+5

7
Very Much
So

+6

+7
I will receive
the large bonus

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

5

6

7
Definitely

How many people were either directly or indirectly allowed to express an opinion during the decision-making process?

74

Appendix C: Study 2 Informed Consent Form
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
Title: Group Influence on Creativity
Investigator(s):
David A. Schroeder, Ph.D
Dennis L. Poepsel, M.S.
University of Arkansas
College of Arts and Sciences
Department of Psychology
216 Memorial Hall
Fayetteville, AR 72703
479-575-4256
Administrator:
Ro Windwalker, Compliance Coordinator
Research & Sponsored Programs
Research Compliance
University of Arkansas
210 Administration
Fayetteville, AR 72701-1201
479-575-2208
irb@uark.edu
Restrictions: You must be at least 18 years old to participate in this experiment.
Description: As a participant, you will join a group and work on tasks to measure creativity while under group influence.
You will also complete a series of questionnaire items about yourself and your experiences in the experiment. This study
will take 1 hour.
Confidentiality: The responses you provide on materials associated with this experiment will be recorded anonymously,
separate from this consent form, and kept confidential to the extent allowed by law and University policy. Your name will
never be used in reporting the results of our research.
Risks and Benefits: There are no risks to participating in the study. By participating in this study, the researchers will have
a clearer picture as to how group member performance is affected by group processes. Participants will also gain insights
into how psychological research is actually conducted. Participants will receive research participation credit for this study
(1 research credit).
Voluntary Participation: Your participation in the research is completely voluntary. You are free to discontinue your
participation in this study at any time. You do not need to answer any question that you do not want to answer. You may
receive credit toward your General Psychology research requirement for participation. If you discontinue participation, you
will still receive credit commensurate with the time you have spent.
Informed Consent: I have read the description, including the nature and purpose of the study, the procedures to be used,
the potential risks and benefits, as well as the option to discontinue my participation in the study at any time. I believe that I
understand what I will be doing. By typing my name below, I indicate that I am over 18 years of age and freely agree to
participate in this experimental study.
____________________________________
Signature
____________________________________
Date
____________________________________
STUDENT ID#

75

Appendix D: Study 2 Demographic/Risk Aversion Questionnaire
Gender:

Male

Please complete the following items. There are no right or wrong answers.
Female

Age: _____________________
Class: Freshman

Sophomore

Junior

Senior

For each of the following statements, please indicate your likelihood of engaging in each activity or behavior.
1. Admitting that your likes and dislikes are different from those of your friends.
1
2
3
4
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely

5
Very Likely

2. Going camping in the wilderness, beyond the civilization of a campground.
1
2
3
4
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely

5
Very Likely

3. Betting a day’s income at the horse races.
1
2
Very Unlikely
Unlikely

3
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

4. Buying an illegal drug for your own use.
1
2
Very Unlikely
Unlikely

3
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

5. Cheating on an exam.
1
Very Unlikely

3
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

6. Chasing a tornado or hurricane by car to take dramatic photos.
1
2
3
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

7. Consuming five or more servings of alcohol in a single evening.
1
2
3
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

8. Cheating by a significant amount on your income tax return.
1
2
3
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

9. Disagreeing with a parent on a major issue.
1
2
Very Unlikely
Unlikely

3
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

10. Betting a day’s income at a high stake poker game.
1
2
3
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

11. Having an affair with a married man or woman.
1
2
3
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

2
Unlikely
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12. Forging somebody’s signature.
1
2
Very Unlikely
Unlikely

3
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

13. Passing off somebody else’s work as your own.
1
2
3
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

14. Going on a vacation in a third-world country without prearranged travel and hotel accommodations.
1
2
3
4
5
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely
Very Likely
15. Arguing with a friend about an issue on which he or she has a very different opinion.
1
2
3
4
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely

5
Very Likely

16. Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability or closed.
1
2
3
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

17. Approaching your boss to ask for a raise.
1
2
Very Unlikely
Unlikely

3
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

18. Illegally copying a piece of software.
1
2
Very Unlikely
Unlikely

3
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

19. Going whitewater rafting during rapid water flows in the spring.
1
2
3
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

20. Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event (e.g., baseball, soccer, or football).
1
2
3
4
5
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely
Very Likely
21. Telling a friend if his or her significant other has made a pass at you.
1
2
3
4
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely

5
Very Likely

22. Shoplifting a small item (e.g., a lipstick or a pen).
1
2
3
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

23. Wearing provocative or unconventional clothes on occasion.
1
2
3
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

24. Engaging in unprotected sex.
1
2
Very Unlikely
Unlikely

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

25. Stealing an additional TV cable connection off the one you pay for.
1
2
3
4
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely

5
Very Likely

3
Not sure

77

26. Not wearing a seatbelt when being a passenger in the front seat.
1
2
3
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

27. Periodically engaging in a dangerous sport (e.g., mountain climbing or sky diving).
1
2
3
4
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely

5
Very Likely

28. Not wearing a helmet when riding a motorcycle.
1
2
3
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

29. Gambling a week’s income at a casino.
1
2
Very Unlikely
Unlikely

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

30. Taking a job that you enjoy over one that is prestigious but less enjoyable.
1
2
3
4
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely

5
Very Likely

31. Defending an unpopular issue that you believe in at a social occasion.
1
2
3
4
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely

5
Very Likely

32. Exposing yourself to the sun without using sunscreen.
1
2
3
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

33. Trying out bungee jumping at least once.
1
2
Very Unlikely
Unlikely

3
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

34. Piloting your own small plane, if you could.
1
2
3
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

35. Walking home alone at night in a somewhat unsafe area of town.
1
2
3
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

36. Regularly eating high cholesterol foods.
1
2
Very Unlikely
Unlikely

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

3
Not sure

3
Not sure

Read the following scenario and answer the question below:
You have recently earned $500. A friend of yours has asked you to invest money into a risky investment. There is a 67%
chance that the investment will fail and a 33% chance the investment will succeed. If the investment fails, you will lose the
amount of money that you invest. If the investment succeeds, you will receive 3.5 times the amount that you invest. What
amount of money would you be willing to invest in this risky investment?
You may invest any amount between $0 and $500.
Investment: _____________________________
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Appendix E: Study 2 Task Description
Your group has been made an offer by Smith & Co. to brainstorm uses for a common, everyday object. However, their
competitor, Craig & Co., would also like to make your group an offer for doing the same task. These companies are
interested in studying how groups affect creativity. Your group can work for either Smith & Co. or for Craig & Co.

The researcher for this session will serve as a representative of Craig & Co. Before we can begin, a decision has to be made
regarding how many points each generated object use will be worth and she will have to choose to negotiate with you in one
of three ways.

The first way the Craig & Co. representative may negotiate with you and your group is to allow you and your fellow group
members to negotiate with her directly by making counter-offers. After you and your fellow group members are allowed to
make direct counter-offers, Craig & Co.’s representative will take all of the offers into consideration and make a final offer.
All group members can then accept the final offer, which means your group will brainstorm uses for Craig & Co. at the
wage agreed to; if all group members reject the final offer, your group will brainstorm uses for Smith & Co. at the rate
offered by them.

The second way the Craig & Co. representative may negotiate with you and your group is to allow a randomly chosen
representative for your group to make a counter-offer on the other members’ behalf with no contact or input from the other
members. After the representative for your group is allowed to make a counter-offer, Craig & Co.’s representative will
consider the offer and make a final offer. Your representative can then accept the final offer, which means your group will
brainstorm uses for Craig & Co. at the wage agreed to; if your representative rejects the final offer, your group will
brainstorm uses for Smith & Co. at the rate offered by them.
The third option for the Craig & Co. representative is to not negotiate with you and your group and to have Craig & Co.’s
initial offer be the final offer. All group members can then accept this final offer, which means your group will brainstorm
uses for Craig & Co. at the wage offered; if all group members reject the final offer, your group will brainstorm uses for
Smith & Co. at the rate offered by them.

Please note that in the past the going rate for this task was 50 points per generated use, with a 50% chance of receiving
points per use. 40 points equals 1 chance in the lottery.

79

Appendix F: Study 2 Process Questionnaire
Please complete this short questionnaire.
I was allowed to voice my opinion about how many points each unique object use will be worth.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4

My views were considered when decisions were being made.
1
2
3
4
Strongly
Disagree
The situation was handled in a fair manner.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

How would you rate the overall fairness with which issues and decisions that came up today were handled?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not Fair at
Very Fair
All
I feel in control of this situation.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

I am certain how many points each generated object use will be worth.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4

I am certain how many points I will earn by the end of today’s session.
1
2
3
4
Strongly
Disagree
I feel uncertain about what is required of me to complete the upcoming task.
1
2
3
4
5
Not at all

6

7
Completely

I feel taken by surprise.
1
Not at all

5

6

7
Completely

5

6

7
Completely

2

3

4

I feel I am unable to function well on the task I am going to complete.
1
2
3
4
Not at all
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Uncertainty will interfere with my performance.
1
2
3
Strongly
disagree

4

I feel I have all the information needed to complete the upcoming task.
1
2
3
4
Strongly
disagree
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5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

Appendix G: Study 2 Script (Personal Voice/Group Voice/No Voice)
Hello, my name is ________. I am the researcher for this experiment. The first thing we need you to do is complete an
Informed Consent form. Please read it over and sign it if you agree to participate. I will collect them when everyone is
done.
Pass out INFORMED CONSENT FORM
Collect INFORMED CONSENT FORM
Today you are going to take part in a study on human creativity within a group context. Specifically, how being a member
of a group affects your behavior. To begin, I would like to have you all fill out a demographic questionnaire. I will collect
them when everyone is done. The number attached to the questionnaire is your personal ID number. Please remove the
number from the questionnaire and put it into the plastic holder to your left. Please use this as your ID number whenever
you are asked for one in the future, not your student ID number.
Pass out DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE
Collect DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE
Like I had said before, today you are going to be working on a task that measures performance while being a member of a
group. The participants in this session will be a group and each of you is a member.
Performance on the task today will allow each of you to earn points for your group. Points are worth chances in a lottery
for Best Buy gift cards at the end of the semester. The more points you have, the more chances in the lottery you will
receive. 40 points equals 1 chance.
Each group member will separately earn points for the group. At the end of the task, your group’s total earned points will
be divided equally back to every member to determine lottery chances. In other words, every group member will receive the
same number of chances in the lottery based on the group’s total number of earned points. Therefore, the number of chances
in the lottery you will receive will depend not only on your performance but on the performance of the entire group.
Questions?
However, your performance will not always guarantee earning points; there is a percentage chance you will earn zero
points during the task.
Questions?
I am now passing out a description of the task today. Please read this over carefully and we will discuss it when everyone is
done.
Pass out TASK DESCRIPTION
Collect TASK DESCRIPTION
Ok, now that you all have read the description of the task, let me ask you some questions.
What are the two companies asking you and your group to do for them? BRAINSTORM USES FOR AN EVERYDAY
OBJECT
What do you earn by generating object uses? POINTS
What are points worth? CHANCES IN A LOTTERY FOR BEST BUY GIFT CARDS
How many points equal 1 chance? 40 POINTS
Historically, what was the going rate for each generated use? 50% CHANCE TO GET 50 POINTS PER USE
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How is Craig & Co. going to allow you to negotiate with them? THERE ARE 3 POSSIBILITIES. FIRST, YOU ALL CAN
NEGOTIATE WITH ME. SECOND, A RANDOMLY CHOSEN GROUP MEMBER CAN NEGOTIATE WITH ME.
THIRD, THERE WILL BE NO NEGOTIATION.
Are there any questions about that???
Will you earn points for every generated use? THERE WILL BE A PERCENTAGE CHANCE YOU WILL NOT EARN
POINTS
Do you have to work for Craig & Co. after we present the final offer? YOU CAN REJECT CRAIG & CO.’s FINAL
OFFER AND YOU ALL WILL WORK FOR SMITH & CO AT THEIR RATE OFFERED.
Make sure all questions have been answered correctly
Now that the task is clear for everyone, I would like you to practice brainstorming ideas to get a feel for the task. I want you
to please help me brainstorm some uses for a “bowl”.
Write BOWL on whiteboard. Write 1., 2., and 3. Ask for 3 uses for a bowl.
Crazy = Heels of shoes or hat...Normal = Bed risers or Eat out of
Does everyone understand the task? Remember that it’s okay to come up with both normal uses and more unique, unusual
uses.
(Personal Voice) Now that you have a sense of what the task will be like, I've decided I'm going to have all of you negotiate
with me.
(Group Voice) Now that you have a sense of what the task will be like, I've decided I’m going to have one of you negotiate
with me.
(No Voice) Now that you have a sense of what the task will be like, I've decided I'm not going to have you negotiate with me.
Go to desk and act out writing offers on OFFER SLIPS
(Personal Voice) I am passing out Craig & Co.’s first offer. Let me know your counter-offer. I will collect them when
everyone is done.
(Group Voice) I am passing out Craig & Co.’s first offer. If you were assigned to be your group’s negotiator, let me know
your counter-offer. If you were not assigned to be your group’s negotiator, complete the question asked. I will collect them
when everyone is done.
(No Voice) Since you will not be negotiating with Craig & Co., I am passing out Craig & Co.’s offer. Please complete the
question asked. I will collect them when everyone is done.
Pass out OFFER SLIPS
Collect OFFER SLIPS
(Personal and Group Voice) While Craig & Co. considers your offers and creates its final offer, please complete this
questionnaire.
(No Voice) Now, please complete this questionnaire.
Pass out PROCESS QUESTIONNAIRE
Let them complete questionnaire items
WAIT 5 MINUTES
(Personal and Group Voice) Ok, it looks like it is taking longer than expected in figuring out Craig & Co.’s final offer. To
save time, let’s have you guys complete the brainstorming task now and afterward Craig & Co.’s offer can be accepted or
rejected. Points will still be given to everyone based on which company you all ultimately work for.
(No Voice) Ok, it looks like this is taking longer than expected. To save time, let’s have you guys complete the brainstorming
task now and afterward Craig & Co.’s offer can be accepted or rejected. Points will still be given to everyone based on
which company you all ultimately work for.
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Collect PROCESS QUESTIONNAIRE
In your packet, you will be given the name of an object and slips of paper. Your task will be to come up with uses for the
object. Please write ONLY ONE use on each slip of paper and then drop the slip into a box that will be given to you.
You are to keep coming up with uses for the object until a set amount of time has passed in which no one came up with a
new use. I will let you know when that time has come and the task will end.
***pick up RED BOX AND SHOW TO EVERYONE***
When the task is done, I will come around and have you empty the contents of your box into this container so we can
determine how many points your group has earned. So, in other words, all of your slips will be mixed together and I will
count up how many uses your group has come up with.
Pass out BRAINSTORMING USES PACKETS and BOXES
Questions?
You may begin.
Time them for 12 minutes
Ok, time is up. Can everyone please put together their unused slips and place everything back into the packet so I can pick
them up.
Collect BRAINSTORMING USES PACKETS and BOXES
Debrief
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Appendix H: Institutional Review Board Approval Letters
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